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Separation of Bank and State: Consolidating Bailed-
Out Companies into the U.S. Debt Ceiling and 




Existing legal and economic theory presumes a clear line between 
private firms and government regulating agencies. It generally assumes 
that corporations maximize profit in the factor markets and 
government regulators alleviate externalities in those markets. The 
circumstances of the financial crisis of 2008 have altered this existing 
dynamic. As a result of the bailout, the government now holds a 
controlling equity interest in many of the nation’s largest financial and 
automotive companies. As a prime example, the government owns a 
34% voting, and thereby effectively controlling, equity interest in 
Citigroup, the nation’s largest bank.  
This Article examines economic theory and evidence of government 
ownership in private firms and finds that government ownership and 
control correlates with overwhelming costs to firm efficiency as 
governments push the firms they control to subsidize influential interest 
groups. As the government does not want to lose its ability to subsidize 
these groups, the usual product markets and the market for corporate 
control that would otherwise maintain profitable enterprises are largely 
muted.  
Part of the explanation for the government’s interest in using its 
control over private firms to serve interest groups is the government’s 
ability to do so off-budget. As such, this Article argues that laws 
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governing the debt ceiling of the United States and the financial 
statements of the United States should be changed to take into account a 
realistic perspective of the government’s obligations that accompany its 
ownership in private firms through the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”) bailout. This perspective should consolidate the financial 
position of firms controlled by the U.S. government, including their 
debt, net revenue, and other financial operations, into the financial 
systems and laws which govern the approval process and disclosure of the 
U.S. government’s finances. In doing so, this Article argues that the 
reforms proposed can partially internalize the costs of interest group 
pressure to abuse the government’s ownership and can also facilitate the 
legislature’s constitutional requirement to oversee appropriations and 
debt repayment of the United States. As a secondary thesis, this Article 
argues that consolidation of the controlled firms will also present a more 
accurate picture to users of government financial statements. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The essence of finance is the art of balancing equity and debt to 
fund the production of the goods and services that drive economic 
growth. This system presumes the existence of two distinct 
institutions. The first institution is a collection of firms owned by 
diversified residual equity holders that manage productive resources 
with a streamlined objective of maximizing shareholder wealth. The 
second institution is a government that subsidizes interest groups 
and regulates market dynamics. The government acts in part to 
maintain equitable outcomes and in part to respond to interest 
group political pressure.  
This Article will examine how the 2008 bailout resulted in a 
dynamic that is dangerous to both the capitalist system of resource 
allocation, particularly its emphasis on residual equity holder 
monitoring, and the American system of government, in particular 
its emphasis on checks and balances in the budgeting, 
appropriations, and debt oversight process. 
In 2008, the nation faced an unprecedented market correction 
that threatened limited systemic consequences to a number of large 
Wall Street firms. Washington reacted by instituting a bailout of 
those firms as well as the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, largely under the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (“TARP”). Washington later extended the bailout to the 
automotive sector. The method chosen for the bailout was largely 
for the government to take equity investments in firms that received 
government funding and backing. The recipient of the lion’s share of 
bailout support, American International Group (“AIG”), was also 
one of the largest insurance companies in the United States. AIG’s 
bailout was directed by the Federal Reserve, a public institution 
backed by the Treasury Department but one step removed from the 
U.S. government. The second largest recipient was Citigroup, the 
largest bank in the United States. The Treasury Department 
uniquely took a common-voting equity interest of thirty-four 
percent in exchange for the funds it injected into Citigroup. Six 
hundred other banks took TARP funding and gave the government 
equity shares in return. 
The dynamic embraced by the American system of firm 
economic resource allocation, buttressed by government regulation 
of that system, presumes a hard black line bifurcating the spheres of 
private economic activity and government oversight activity. The 
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bailout of 2008–2009 eviscerates that hard black line and instead 
creates a system of perverse incentives to maximize shareholder 
wealth while at the same time subsidizing politically powerful interest 
groups, despite the fact that the two goals are frequently mutually 
exclusive. 
When the government controls companies owned by others, it 
can use its regulatory leverage, along with its position as a lender of 
last resort, to encourage private firms to reorient their activities 
toward goals that serve politically influential interest groups. One 
would think that private sector resource allocation, including the 
market for capital and the market for corporate control, would police 
abuses by government shareholders in companies that maintain 
private sector ownership. Due to particular aspects of the 
government’s role as shareholder, these constraints lose their force. 
This is because of the nature of the government’s implicit backing of 
government-owned institutions as well as the disparity between the 
government’s ability to maintain an information asymmetry in 
relation to its implicit obligations. It is also due to the fact the 
government actors will have an incentive to maintain their control 
over firms that permit off-balance sheet transfers. 
The government lacks a credible mechanism to commit to not 
bailing out banks.1 To the extent that the bailout will take the form 
of equity investment or will otherwise involve the sorts of strings that 
will indicate control, this Article will show some changes in the 
national debt ceiling statute and accounting rules for the 
government’s ownership that may provide the necessary incentive to 
limit government interest in bailouts, and permit, if not a 
commitment not to bail out banks, at least a limitation on the 
prospect of government bailouts. These controls could be expected 
to limit the market distortions of bank policy as well as distortions on 
bank bond premiums premised on too-big-to-fail cushions.2 
This Article argues that the paradox of government ownership, 
and the government’s obligations flowing from that ownership, can 
at least be minimized in two unique ways. The two methods center 
around the central principle that, much like private sector companies 
that use minority equity investments to control other companies, and 
 
 1. GARY H. STERN & RON J. FELDMAN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE HAZARD OF BANK 
BAILOUTS 60–66 (2004).  
 2. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247 (2010). 
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much like the United Kingdom and New Zealand’s approach to 
recognizing ownership of government-owned entities, the United 
States government should consolidate the financial operations of 
entities over which it has control and include them in its estimate of 
the national debt ceiling and the government’s financial statements. 
This methodology would cause the government to partially 
internalize the cost of its holding an interest in inherently private 
sector entities. As a secondary thesis, this Article argues that the 
government can fulfill its disclosure obligations to users of federal 
government financial statements by consolidating its ownership, in 
particular by giving economists a more accurate picture of the 
crowding-out effects of government spending on fiscal growth by 
noting the government’s control over what would otherwise be 
counted as private sector spending and debt.  
This Article examines the laws and accounting methods for 
internalizing the cost of government ownership and presenting more 
accurate disclosure to users of financial statements. The first method 
examines whether the government should follow the lead of its 
common law brethren in the United Kingdom and New Zealand by 
consolidating its investment in bailout recipients onto the federal 
government’s financial statements. This method is supported by an 
uncontroverted assessment of the government’s own accounting 
principles as well as the use of private sector accounting principles 
that hold force in this unique circumstance where the government is 
acting like a private sector investor. 
This Article does not argue that the U.S. government should 
include the operations of TARP recipients in the federal budget 
process. In part, this is because the federal budget process has failed 
to represent a binding constraint on government appropriations, as 
Congressional exceptions to limits like the pay-go rules seem to 
overwhelm the rules themselves.3 It is also motivated by the fact that 
consolidating the earnings of government-controlled firms into the 
federal budget process could be used to actually manipulate the 
federal budget by manipulating the controlled company’s earnings. 
As the author has explored in previous work, government controlled 
firms tend to obtain preferential regulatory treatment.4 Thus it will 
 
 3. See Lori Montgomery, House Votes to Revive Pay-As-You-Go Budget Rules, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 5, 2010, at A02. 
 4. See J.W. Verret, The Bailout Through a Public Choice Lens: Government-Controlled 
Companies as a Mechanism for Rent Transfer, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1521 (2010). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 12:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
396 
be more likely that a government controlled firm could manipulate 
its earnings and still avoid investigation by the SEC. 
Finally, and most importantly, the government should include 
the debt of bailout recipients in the statutory definition of the debt 
ceiling. The requirement that Congress periodically vote to extend 
the debt ceiling, if at all, helps to maintain the legislature’s 
constitutional obligation to oversee the spending and debt 
management of the federal government. The debt ceiling statute 
affords members of Congress an opportunity to consider the long-
term health of the nation’s finances free from the short-term pressure 
of the annual budget process. The procedural rules of that vote also 
help to limit the log-rolling phenomenon that takes place in budget 
votes and is examined in the public choice literature. Furthermore, 
the periodic vote on the debt ceiling is subject to filibuster, to which 
the annual budget resolution is immune. In short, if the executive 
branch faced the prospect of a hard-fought negotiation over a vote 
to expand the debt ceiling statute (and it can be hard-fought even if 
the executive and legislative branches are run by the same party), and 
if, as this Article suggests, the debt ceiling statute included in its 
definition those debts held by firms in which the United States 
maintained controlling equity ownership, then the executive branch 
would have an incentive to privatize its ownership. This would 
greatly delay its need to negotiate with Congress over an extension 
of the debt ceiling statute. 
There is no guarantee that the policy goals advocated in this 
Article will be implemented. Even if they are implemented, they may 
not fully minimize the costs of government ownership in private 
sector entities described in this Article. The changes advocated in 
this Article, however, represent the best short-term and politically 
feasible policy alternatives that stand to force the government to 
internalize the costs of its ownership in formerly private firms. That 
cost, incidentally, is tremendous. The government’s current 
investment, at cost, is approximately $200 billion. That $200 billion 
is used to control trillions in equity by investors who do not have the 
incentives or resources to govern their investments in a majority of 
banking firms. Those trillions in wealth are housed in the banking 
sector, which itself is foundational to the roughly $40 trillion in 
publicly traded wealth in the United States. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 12:45 PM 
391 Separation of Bank and State 
 397 
II. GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF COMPANIES UNDER THE TARP 
BAILOUT 
A. History of the TARP Bailout 
In response to a dramatic credit freeze that placed the health of 
the financial industry under severe pressure in late 2008, the U.S. 
government initiated a $700 billion bailout of the financial industry 
that mainly consisted of the Treasury purchasing equity in troubled 
banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”). In order 
to execute its mandate to ensure the health of the nation’s banking 
system under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (“EESA”), 
the Treasury Department purchased controlling interests in hundreds 
of the nation’s largest banks, General Motors (“GM”), and Chrysler, 
as well as the insurance conglomerate American International Group 
(“AIG”) and GMAC, the financing arm of General Motors.5 Under 
the Making Home Affordable Program, the Treasury offered to use 
nearly $50 billion in TARP funding, in conjunction with at least 
$200 billion from the Federal Reserve, to support Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, both of which are now majority-owned by the federal 
government under conservatorship.6 
The original plan for the TARP program was for the government 
to use the $700 billion authorized under the EESA to buy and sell 
troubled assets held on the balance sheet of banks.7 That plan was 
quickly shelved, and the Treasury Department immediately began a 
number of different programs. As part of that bailout, the Treasury 
took preferred equity in TARP recipients and subsequently initiated 




 5. Former Treasury Assistant Secretary Phillip Swagel provides a first-hand account of 
the implementation of TARP. See Phillip Swagel, The Financial Crisis: An Inside View, 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, Spring 2009, at 1–79, 
http://www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2009_s
pring_bpea_papers/2009_spring_bpea_swagel.pdf; see also, Steven Rattner, The Auto Bailout: 
How We Did It, FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 2009, at 55, available at http://money.cnn.com/2009/ 
10/21/autos/auto_bailout_rattner.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2009102104. 
 6. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM Q. REP., July 21, 2009, at 36, available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/ 
reports/congress/2009/July2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf [hereinafter SIG TARP 
REPORT JULY 2009]. 
 7. Id. at 3. 
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convertible into voting common equity. The Treasury’s initial 
experiment in holding common equity took place at Citigroup, in 
which it took a controlling thirty-four percent voting stake.8  
The automotive industry also subsequently garnered TARP 
support when, in December 2008, the Treasury announced that it 
would use TARP funds to establish the Auto Industry Financing 
Program (“AIFP”) to stabilize the automotive industry, where over 
$17 billion in loans were offered to GM and Chrysler on condition 
that they submit restructuring plans.9 The Obama Administration 
rejected the initial proposals and instead created the Automotive 
Task Force to negotiate a new viability plan.10 
The government’s investment through TARP is fairly 
concentrated; for instance, as of September 2, 2009, the total 
outstanding federal government assistance committed to AIG stood 
at $120.7 billion, of which $69.8 billion represented TARP 
investment by the Treasury.11 The Treasury’s net investment in GM 
and Chrysler totaled $76.9 billion, and investments in Citigroup 
stood at $50 billion.12 The total of nearly $200 billion invested 
under EESA authority in these four companies represents well more 
than half of the $381.4 billion net cumulative funds expended by the 
Treasury under TARP as of September 30, 2009. As such, this 
Article will focus particular attention on those four companies. This 
Article will also analyze Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conjunction 
with TARP recipients, even though technically their conservatorship 
preceded TARP. 
 
 8. See Robert Schmidt & Bradley Keoun, Citigroup 34% Stake Sale Discussed at U.S. 
Treasury, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2009, 4:15 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=acs7LZGlwiYU. 
 9.  Roger Runningen & John Hughes, GM and Chrysler Will Get $13.4 Billion in U.S. 
Loans, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 19, 2008, 5:21 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news? 
pid=newsarchive&sid=aGHdHOHwvZWo; WHITE HOUSE, DETERMINATION OF VIABILITY 
SUMMARY: CHRYSLER, LLC (Mar. 30, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
assets/documents/Chrysler_Viability_Assessment.pdf; see also Stephen J. Lubben, No Big 
Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531, 545 (2009). 
 10. SIG TARP REPORT JULY 2009, supra note 6, at 35; see also Lubben, supra note 9. 
 11. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-975, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM: STATUS OF GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE TO AIG (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09975.pdf [hereinafter GAO STATUS REPORT].  
 12. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM Q. REP., at 43, 67, 90, available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/ 
2009/October2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf [hereinafter SIG TARP REPORT 
OCT. 2009].  
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B. The Government’s Control Through TARP 
A substantial line of authority supports the proposition that 
either just having the power to control a company or the actual 
exercise of control is sufficient to control a company. In In re 
Walston & Co.,13 the SEC held that the power to control could be 
evidenced by a creditor’s right to 90% of profits, status as the source 
of most of Walston’s business, and the option to acquire stock.14 
This was despite the fact that the creditor did not participate in the 
actual management of the business and held no actual stock.15 In 
effect, the power to control is sufficient to make one a controlling 
person, despite the fact that the power is never actually exercised. 
SEC v. Franklin Atlas Corp.16 also supports the notion the 
percentage of stock ownership is not alone determinative.17 In that 
case, a manager with the ability to control an enterprise was 
determined to be a control person, even though he actually owned 
no stock and the company had a controlling shareholder who owned 
a majority of the stock.18 
This is analogous to the situation facing many TARP banks. The 
U.S. government is a substantial creditor of the companies in 
addition to owning positions in them,19 and also holds the ability to 
substantially affect the bank’s underlying business through its 
discretion in setting capital requirements and limiting bank 
operations. Under this view, the fact that Treasury or the Federal 
Reserve did not engage in active management of TARP banks, and 
the fact that Treasury’s ownership in most TARP participants is non-
voting, would therefore be irrelevant to this determination. 
In the opening chapter of the auto bailout, the government’s 
behavior also evidences Treasury’s control of that industry through 
its investments. In its September 2009 report, the Congressional 
 
 13. 7 S.E.C. 937 (1940). 
 14. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Who’s “In Control”?—S.E.C., 21 BUS. LAW. 559, 564 (1966) 
(citing Walston, 7 S.E.C. at 937). 
 15. Id. at 564 (citing Walston, 7 S.E.C. at 937). 
 16. 154 F. Supp. 395, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
 17. Sommer, supra note 14, at 565 (citing Franklin Atlas, 154 F. Supp. at 395). 
 18. See id. at 559. 
 19. Press Release, U.S. Treasury, U.S. Treasury Releases Terms of Capital Assistance 
Program (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ 
tg40.aspx. See also J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and 
Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 294–301 (2010) [hereinafter Verret, Treasury Inc.]. 
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Oversight Panel concluded that Treasury “used its own assumptions 
to conduct stress tests on these plans, looked at a variety of scenarios 
in order to formulate cash flow capability and the likely earnings 
capacity of the companies, challenged the companies to look 
forward, and created models of ‘potential enterprise value.’”20 The 
Automotive Task Force was an especially active participant in the 
proceedings, which saw replacement of the CEO and half of the 
board of directors, bankruptcy filings, debtor-in-possession 
financing, and wholesale financial and business restructuring.21 
In AIG and GM, U.S. government voting rights constitute 
outright majorities (nearly 80 percent in AIG and 61 percent in 
GM), while in Citigroup and Chrysler, the combination of 
concentrated government shareholding and the broad scope of 
additional federal support22 justifies the description of the U.S. 
government as a dominant shareholder.  
In the case of AIG, a trusteeship model was formally 
implemented. The trustees nominated by the Federal Reserve to 
govern the trust have argued that the Federal Reserve’s action 
minimized any control the government may have over AIG.23 On 
January 16, 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(“FRBNY”), acting in consultation with the Treasury Department, 
entered into an agreement24 with three private individuals named as  
 
 20. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, OVERSIGHT REPORT: USE OF TARP FUNDS IN THE 
SUPPORT AND REORGANIZATION OF THE DOMESTIC AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 104 (Sep. 9, 
2009) (citing Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Testimony of 
Senior Advisor at the U.S. Department of Treasury Ron Bloom, The State of the Domestic 
Automobile Industry: Impact of Federal Assistance, at 5–6 (June 10, 2009)). 
 21. See generally Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 19. 
 22. For example, federal support to Citigroup includes a potential federal liability of as 
much as $260 billion for guarantees of $300 billion of the bank’s pool of asset-backed 
securities. According to the SIG TARP’s Quarterly Report to Congress issued on October 21, 
2009, SIG TARP REPORT OCT. 2009 supra note 12, at 69, the list of assets to be “ring-
fenced” was not finalized, but was expected to be finalized by October 31, 2009. Initial plans 
called for Citigroup to absorb $39.5 billion in losses prior to government support; TARP 
assets would cover the next $5 billion in losses, id. at 42, with FDIC ($10 billion) and the 
Federal Reserve bank of New York responsible for any remaining requirements.  
 23. Statement of the Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust Before the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2009) (joint statement of Jill M. 
Considine, Chester B. Feldberg & Douglass L. Foshee), available at http:// 
www.aigcreditfacilitytrust.com/aigweb/internet/en/files/Written%20Statement_tcm1121-
242400.pdf. 
 24. AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement (Jan. 16, 2009), http:// 
www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/AIGCFTAgreement.pdf. 
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Trustees and placed the authority to vote the government’s shares in 
AIG in the hands of the Trustees.25 
The Trust agreement gave the Trustees the “exclusive right to 
vote the Trust Stock, or give written consent, in person or by proxy, 
at all meetings of stockholders of the Company.”26 Section 2.04(f) of 
the trusteeship agreement further states that “[i]n no event shall the 
Trustees become directors of the Company or otherwise become 
responsible for directing or managing the day-to-day operations of 
the Company or any of its subsidiaries.” The AIG Trust insulates the 
trustees from liability so long as they believe they acted lawfully and 
“in or not opposed to the best interests of the Treasury.”27 
Two substantial reports released by the GAO discuss the U.S. 
shareholding in AIG and in the auto companies.28 Regarding federal 
government oversight of AIG, the GAO’s report found, “While the 
government has not taken over management of AIG, it has taken a 
number of steps to create certain controls over AIG’s management 
of the company.”29 The Federal Reserve and FRBNY have between 
twenty and twenty-five people assigned to monitor AIG, and 
FRBNY has hired professional advisors to assist in monitoring. 
Notably, FRBNY officials receive weekly detailed reports on cash 
forecasts, liquidity updates, and regulatory developments.30 The 
GAO found that in June 2009 AIG trustees used their voting power 
to force changes in a majority of the company’s directors, and that 
the new board subsequently hired a new chief executive officer in 
August 2009.31 Instead of reflecting a hands-off approach to 
governance, however, the GAO found that Treasury and the FRBNY 
 
 25. The agreement provided no binding guidance to the Trustees on the objectives for 
which shareholding was to be exercised, prevented the Trustees from taking a seat on the 
Board of Directors of AIG, and indemnified the Trustees against any liability for decisions they 
might make regarding voting of AIG shares. Id. §§ 2.04(f), 3.03(d). However, the Agreement 
includes a fiduciary duty provision which requires the AIG Trustees to act in the best interests 
of the Treasury. Id. § 2.05(a). 
 26. Id. § 2.04(b). 
 27. Id. § 3.03(a). 
 28. See GAO STATUS REPORT, supra note 11; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-10-151, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: CONTINUED STEWARDSHIP NEEDED AS 
TREASURY DEVELOPS STRATEGIES FOR MONITORING AND DIVESTING FINANCIAL INTERESTS 
IN CHRYSLER AND GM (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d10151.pdf.  
 29. GAO STATUS REPORT, supra note 11, at 37. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 38. 
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“continue to have their own relationship [with AIG management] 
and conduct their own monitoring of AIG operations.”32  
On June 1, 2009, after Chrysler’s reorganization had been 
approved by a bankruptcy court, President Obama announced that 
the United States would be supporting a similar approach with 
General Motors and would be converting existing and new loans to 
both companies into common equity.33 In a press briefing given the 
evening before the President’s press conference, an administration 
official summarized the White House position on “Government as 
Shareholder.”34 The Treasury Department’s statement on the GM 
restructuring says that it intends to manage its investment in GM in 
a “hands-off . . . commercial manner.”35 The Treasury also published 
a white paper regarding its ownership in GM in which it offered four 
key principles for how it would try to minimize political influence in 
GM’s operations; yet there is no mechanism by which those 
principles can be enforced by a third party, nor are there any 
penalties for their violation.36 
The government holds non-voting preferred stock in most of the 
TARP recipients, with the exception of Citigroup and the 
automotive companies. Notwithstanding the non-voting nature of 
the Treasury’s investment in TARP firms, the government’s 
ownership of TARP-preferred shares gives the government leverage 
over the business decisions of these firms.37 For example, the TARP 
provisions allow the Treasury to nominate two “preferred directors” 
to the board in the event that a TARP firm misses six consecutive 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on General Motors Restructuring 
(Jun. 1, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-
General-Motors-Restructuring.  
 34. Senior Administration Officials, Background Briefing on the General Motors 
Restructuring (May 31, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Background-
Briefing-on-GM-Restructuring-May-31-2009.  
 35. Id.  
 36. SIG TARP REPORT JULY 2009, supra note 6, at 111. Core principles in the 
Treasury’s White Paper include to i) “seek to dispose of its ownership interest as soon as 
practicable;” ii) “reserve the right to set upfront conditions to protect taxpayers, promote 
financial stability, and encourage growth;” iii) “protect the taxpayers’ investment by managing 
its ownership stake in a hands-off, commercial manner;” and iv) “vote on core governance 
issues, including the selection of a company’s board of directors and major corporate events or 
transactions.” Id. 
 37. J.W. Verret, The U.S. Government as Control Shareholder of the Financial and 
Automotive Sector: Implications and Analysis (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 
09-13, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348256. 
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quarterly dividend payments.38 “Treasury[‘s] preferred shares also 
retain[] the right to vote on any mergers or exchange activity and on 
new issuance of shares.”39 The government also mandated certain 
corporate governance changes for TARP firms. “Assuming that 
Treasury maintains the legal authority to waive those provisions, it 
could offer to do so in exchange for other changes in corporate 
policy.”40  
Much of this Article will consider the implications of the 
government’s ownership in TARP recipients, Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, and AIG together. Therefore, it will generally not be necessary 
to delineate between them for the broad theoretical and budget law 
considerations examined. As such, these entities generally will be 
referred to as “Bailed-Out Entities” or “BOEs.” Where issues are 
driven by characteristics particular to an entity, as in the case of 
differential accounting by Federal rules between Fannie Mae and 
other bailed-out companies, the various BOEs will be examined 
separately. 
III. ECONOMIC THEORY AND EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED 
COMPANIES 
The final objective of this Article is to determine the appropriate 
method of representing the government’s economic ownership of 
BOEs in its financial reporting and the appropriate method for 
harnessing the existing structures that check the federal 
government’s borrowing and spending authority to oversee the 
government’s investment. But before we can do that, we will need to 
develop an appreciation for the economic nature and the attendant 
costs of government ownership. This Section will examine the 
existing theoretical and empirical evidence on government ownership 
to develop one of the foundational justifications for the thesis that 
limiting the depth and nature of government ownership in private 
firms is desirable. This Section will use economic theory, as well as 
evidence from government ownership from around the globe, to 
offer some predictions for how governments will make decisions as 
controlling shareholders.  
 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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Comparisons to the different forms of government ownership in 
Europe, Asia, and South America teach that government-owned 
banks are frequently used to advance political agendas to the 
detriment of a bank’s financial health. Advancing a political agenda 
may actually be easier through controlling common equity stakes, an 
effective semi-nationalization, than through outright nationalization. 
A government agency using shareholder power over private 
companies has two unique freedoms: 1) the ability to bypass the 
administrative law process, the separation of powers, and the judicial 
review that constrain regulatory discretion, and instead simply 
require the board to initiate corporate policy changes favored by the 
Treasury;41 and 2) the ability to bypass the federal budget process 
and instead require banks that are not included in the federal budget 
to themselves fund the transfers.42 The combination of these 
exceptions to federal law undermines transparency constraints that 
work to minimize transfers to political interest groups and instead 
allows the government to require the bank to make those transfers in 
the form of increased lending and artificial interest rate caps that 
reside entirely off the federal budget.43 
 
 41. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s 
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 468 (2009). 
 42. See id. at 489. The consequences of moving the debt of private banks onto the 
public budget can be severe. For instance, when the United Kingdom moved the liabilities of 
two bailed-out banks in which it owns a control stake (i.e., Royal Bank of Scotland Group and 
Lloyds Banking Group) onto the public balance sheet, it added $2.136 trillion to the public 
debt, more than doubling the U.K.’s public debt. Alistair McDonald & Laurence Norman, 
Bank Bailouts, Sinking Revenue Fray U.K.’s Ledger, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at A10. 
 43. Part of the relationship between Fannie and Freddie was a sort of interest group 
feedback loop that demonstrates this problem. Fannie and Freddie were permitted to lobby 
Congress with political donations. Peter Wallison, How Paulson Would Save Fannie Mae, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008, at A17. When the government was forced to take Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, the government did not completely eliminate preferred 
and common stockholders, but limited its stake to 79.9%. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 41, 
at 489. Davidoff and Zaring offer four reasons which may have informed the decision to leave 
some equity outstanding: 1) support of Treasury’s position that it did not have to consolidate 
the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”) onto the federal budget, 2) keeping the 
GSEs from having to adopt government accounting rules, 3) permitting the GSEs to deduct 
interest on their government loans from their taxes (which they would not be able to do if 
deemed government controlled), and 4) keeping the government from becoming liable for the 
GSEs retirement liabilities. Id. at 489. David Moffett, Freddie’s most recent CEO, resigned 
after just six months, citing social mandates from the government that impeded his ability to 
turn around the company and make it profitable. James R. Hagerty & Joann S. Lublin, Freddie 
Chief Quits after Six Months, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2009, at A4. Prior to the revelations of 
accounting irregularities at the two GSEs, its dedicated regulator performed the sort of 
inspections and audits typical of a financial regulator without uncovering any problems. Peter 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 12:45 PM 
391 Separation of Bank and State 
 405 
In the context of government ownership of private sector 
entities, the nature of the government’s accounting for its potential 
future liabilities is one concern driving the analysis in this Article. 
Other distinct concerns in this context are the distorting effects that 
government ownership has on the operations of the business in 
which it owns an interest. Still a third concern is that the prospect of 
government bailout also distorts market outcomes through moral 
hazard. As such, after examining the economic theory and evidence 
describing these effects, this Article will analyze how to use laws 
limiting the national debt and government accounting principles to 
achieve three goals: 1) present a more accurate picture of the 
government’s obligations to users of government financial reports; 
2) increase the cost to the government for bailing out private sector 
entities to restrict instances of bailout to only those situations 
actually implicating systemic risk concerns; and 3) encourage the 
government to divest of equity positions taken in bailed-out 
companies as soon as possible, rather than use its equity control to 
effectuate public policy outcomes. 
A. Theory of Government Owned Firms 
Government shareholders certainly are not the only shareholders 
that can alter the value of the firm by virtue of their presence as an 
owner. Evidence suggests that the relationship between ownership 
by managers and firm value is concave.44 This is because other 
shareholders may be concerned that the larger shareholder will use 
their control over the firm to encourage corporate policy changes 
that work to the larger shareholder’s advantage at the expense of the 
other shareholders in the firm. The relationship is not static, 
however, and changes as the relative tradeoff between extracting 
private value and losing their proportional value invested in the firm 
 
J. Wallison, Moral Hazard on Steroids: The OFHEO Report Shows that Regulation Cannot 
Protect U.S. Taxpayers, FIN. SERVICES OUTLOOK (Am. Enterprise Inst. for Pub. Pol’y 
Research), July 2006, at 3, available at http://www.aei.org/outlook/24591 [hereinafter 
Wallison, Moral Hazard]. Everyone was, however, completely taken by surprise when, for 
instance, the board of Freddie Mac dismissed its top two officers for accounting irregularities. 
Peter J. Wallison, The Evolution of a Policy Idea: How Restrictions on the Size of the GSEs’ 
Portfolios Became the Central Issue in Reform of Their Regulation 14 (NFI, Working Paper No. 
2006-PB-03, 2006), available at http://www.aei.org/paper/24056 [hereinafter Wallison, 
The Evolution of a Policy Idea]. 
 44. Renè M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 25, 25–54 (1988). 
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changes for shareholders with larger percentage ownership.45 A 
debate has ensued in the corporate governance and finance literature 
considering at what point the cost of large shareholders exceeds the 
benefits they offer by lowering agency costs in oversight of firm 
managers.46 The unique incentives facing government ownership in 
the circumstances that are the subject of this Article introduce a new 
twist to this debate.  
Outside of the United States, many Western countries have 
historically been characterized by significant government ownership 
of private companies.47 The United States, however, largely 
abandoned government investment in private companies after a 
significant period in the 1840s of explicit use of mixed enterprises as 
instruments of public policy.48 One of the reasons for the 
government’s interest in taking a controlling investment in private 
companies is to utilize its investment to transfer funds to interest 
groups off of the federal budget. This permits the benefit of 
appeasing political supporters without the cost of raising taxes or 
taking on debt. In the dynamic analyzed in this Article, the 
government is taking an interest in companies in which investors 
either maintain or formerly held an equity interest, a structure that is 
fairly new in the United States.49 
 
 45. Stijn Claessens et al., Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large 
Shareholdings, 57 J. FIN. 2741, 2741–71 (2002). 
 46. For the argument that the incentives to extract private value are the more powerful 
incentive for large shareholder, see Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One 
Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1988); Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). For the other 
side of the debate, that the benefits of lowering agency costs will tend to exceed the costs of 
large shareholder private wealth extraction, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & 
George G. Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms 
and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K Morck ed., 2000). 
 47. Stephen Brooks, The Mixed Ownership Corporation as an Instrument of Public Policy, 
19 COMP. POL. 173, 173–74 (1987). 
 48. Id. at 176. Brooks examines some cases in which mixed enterprises were able to 
maintain autonomy from the government, such as the case of British Petroleum (BP) refusing 
to divert sales of oil to foreign customers to subsidize British oil consumption during the 1973 
oil embargo. Id. at 178–79. It may, however, remain difficult to determine whether 
expressions of managerial autonomy are in fact reflective of a lack of distortionary control 
exercised by the government shareholder. In particular, such exercise of managerial authority 
may be merely the result of collusion, either explicit or implicit, between the government and 
the managers in ways that work to the detriment of other shareholders or to the value of the 
taxpayer’s investment. 
 49. The same dynamic has been studied in the related area of off-budget public sector 
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Alcian and Demsetz argue that firm ownership of productive 
assets offers unique efficiencies as firms obtain superior information 
about the uses and productivity of internal firm assets, thus reducing 
the cost of searching out combinations of productive assets.50 The 
government-owned firm limits this advantage, however, because the 
government will have an interest in using resources based not on 
their efficiency or effectiveness but on rewarding political support 
from resources or owners of resources either inside or outside the 
firm.51 Theory developed to appreciate the implications of pure 
government ownership of productive assets can inform our 
understanding of mixed ownership. Peltzman examines the question 
of pure government ownership of firms when he asks, “If a privately 
owned firm is socialized, and nothing else changes, how will the 
ownership change alone affect the firm’s behavior?”52 Peltzman 
opens by noting that, although government owners will initially have 
an interest in maximizing firm profits because it will limit the tax 
burden on constituents, their interest in maintaining their 
incumbency means they will be willing to trade those profits to 
obtain support.53 As such, government owners can be expected to 
 
authorities designed explicitly for the purpose of off-budget public activities. These institutions 
were intended to evade public debt limitation laws passed to constrict runaway spending by 
legislatures and town councils. See C. Robert Morris, Jr., Evading Debt Limitations with Public 
Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958). As 
such, since their activities don’t alter the debt calculations for their sponsoring municipal 
organizations, they operate off of the budgets of their sponsoring governments as well. They 
are pitched as self-financing organizations, but most end up requiring government subsidy and 
backing to operate, making their off-budget classification a frequently misleading fiction. See 
generally JAMES T. BENNETT & THOMAS J. DILORENZO, UNDERGROUND GOVERNMENT: 
THE OFF-BUDGET PUBLIC SECTOR 587 (1983). For the unique nature of the TARP 
companies, see Verret, Treasury Inc., supra note 19, at 293. 
 50. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 793 (1972). 
 51. One of Alcian and Demsetz’s explanations for why firms exist is to solve the 
problem of metering, or linking rewards to outputs, in team production where marginal 
products of team members is not easily observable. Id. at 778–83. The claimant with the right 
to residual earnings will have the best incentive to monitor team inputs and meter the marginal 
productivity of inputs to the team’s output. Id. at 782. But this requires an ability to discipline 
individual team members and revise or terminate their contracts. Id. at 782–83. With the 
government as shareholder, this power to discipline is either reduced or potentially used for the 
wrong reasons. Managers are no longer disciplined for shirking, but for failing to maximize 
utility for the interest groups to which the government shareholder is beholden. 
 52. Sam Peltzman, Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the 
United States, 14 J.L. & ECON. 109, 110 (1971). 
 53. Id. at 112–14. 
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use the pricing system to confer benefits on voters and interest 
groups.54 Peltzman notes that in order to yield a net political gain, 
government owners will likely be required to charge differential 
prices to benefit a majority of consumers.55 This would correspond 
with the administration’s emphasis on pressuring TARP recipients to 
renegotiate mortgages rather than alter rates across the board, since 
loan forgiveness is effectively targeted as a price rebate to lower 
income consumers. Peltzman also argues that the government 
owned firm will be able to subsidize specific groups with less cost to 
the government through differential pricing than through changes to 
tax and subsidy policy.56  
Since the government will be less willing to sell out its position 
and lose the off-balance-sheet subsidy mechanism, the market for 
corporate control as a limiting boundary on manager shirking within 
the private firm, explored by Henry Manne, will also be muted.57 
One prerequisite to a shareholder’s ability to act as an efficient 
monitor is his ability to sell his bundle of rights, including interest in 
residual claims and monitoring rights.58 This helps to create a market 
that, if liquid, can help to reveal the expected present market value of 
the firm’s future production. But there are a few constraints that 
limit a government’s ability or interest in selling its investment, one 
of which is its inability to continue to use the entity for off-budget 
transfers if it has sold its investment.59 That is not to say that the 
government will not agree to sell its investment in TARP firms, 
because it has already done so for Bank of America and others. It is 
worth noting, however, that the pressures that will limit that option 
for other firms, particularly those like AIG, in which the government 
has a large stake and the profitability of the firm, will remain in 
severe stress for the foreseeable future. 
Another cost associated with government ownership of private 
firms that limits the ability to ever actually privatize the firm is that 
government ownership can represent a shift in institutional design in 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 113. 
 56. Id. at 119–20. 
 57. For the origins of the theory of the market for corporate control as a disciplining 
mechanism, see generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 
J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). 
 58. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 50, at 783. 
 59. See Peltzman, supra note 52, at 119–20. 
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midstream. The firms are initially organized to maximize returns for 
residual claimants, but once they are bailed out and the government 
takes an equity interest in the firm, it can acquire a dual mandate: 
maximize profits and facilitate the public interest. The government 
can take steps to limit the ability of private investors to monitor how 
fulfilling that dual mandate imposes costs on the other residual 
claimant shareholders. For instance, the government can give 
government-owned firms preferential regulatory treatment in rules 
designed to require firms to provide informative disclosures to 
investors. The Treasury Department’s position on Fannie Mae is an 
example of how the government emphasizes the national interest 
mission of a private business.60 And yet some evidence suggests that 
only highly profitable companies can be effectively privatized. Thus, 
the more the government uses the firm for off-balance sheet 
subsidies, the less likely it will be to privatize the firm.61 
Another criticism of government-owned firms is that the threat 
of bankruptcy or takeover, which would otherwise discipline 
management, is not present in government-run firms.62 This criticism 
supplements the view that governments will reorient the company’s 
objective from profit maximization to other goals like employment 
maximization.63 When the government’s interest is only a partial 
interest, many of these problems remain because governments tend 
 
 60. Fannie and Freddie: The Last SIVs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2010, at A18. 
 61. Pint’s study of the British nationalization and subsequent privatization of coal and 
other industries suggests that governments are more concerned with the redistribution of 
interest group benefits than with economic efficiency in both of those processes. Ellen M. Pint, 
Nationalization and Privatization: A Rational-Choice Perspective on Efficiency, 10 J. PUB. 
POL’Y 267, 270 (1990). The National Coal Board that was created as part of Britain’s 
nationalization of the coal industry was charged with “making supplies of coal available in such 
quantities and at such prices as may seem to them best calculated to further the public 
interest.” Id. at 274. The British Treasury also tended to distribute any profits from the 
industries they oversaw to labor, rather than minimize the costs to government nationalization 
by returning those profits to the Treasury. Id. at 276. It was also found that once 
nationalization occurred, it became very difficult to re-privatize those firms unless they 
returned to profitability. Id. at 279. This occurs because the only alternative is for the 
government to shut down the firm and fire the workers, which governments are loathe to do, 
and because after the interest groups have had their way with the firm, the firm becomes 
worthless without the government guarantee behind it. 
 62. Alexander Muravyev, Federal State Shareholdings in Russian Companies: Origin, 
Forms and Consequences for Enterprise Performance 17 (Bank of Fin. Inst. for Economies in 
Transition, Discussion Paper No. 12, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015707. 
 63. Id. (citing Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms, 109 Q.J. 
ECON. 995 (1994); Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Theory of 
Privatisation, 106 ECON. J. 309 (1996)).  
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to bail out firms in which they have an equity stake with greater 
frequency.64 When other shareholders lose confidence in 
management, they sell their stock, but when governments lose 
confidence in management, they inject more capital into the firm. 
This means that the bankruptcy constraint is minimized. If the 
government maintains the ability to limit takeovers through voting 
in M&A situations, it will also exacerbate the managerial limitation.  
B. Evidence Regarding Government-Owned Firms 
A substantial amount of prior literature evidences the risks of the 
second form of government nationalization of banks. However, 
there is relatively little literature on government ownership of private 
and publicly traded firms in the United States; thus, most of this 
Section will require an international focus.65 With respect to the 
banking industry in particular, a leading study finds that government 
ownership of banks is negatively correlated with financial 
development and economic growth.66 One study uses comparisons 
across 36 countries to reveal that governments tend to lend more 
 
 64. Id. at 18. 
 65. One of the few existing systematic studies of government ownership in private firms 
in the United States is from Stacey Kole and J. Harold Mulherin. Stacey R. Kole & J. Harold 
Mulherin, The Government as a Shareholder: A Case from the United States, 40 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1997). They focus on a sample of 17 firms in which the government held a large stake just 
following World War II, largely as a result of the federal government seizing corporate assets of 
Japanese and German companies. Id. at 3–4. The comparison is limited, only 7 of the 17 had 
shares traded publicly at the time of seizure. Id. at 6. Further, the type of business will have 
some effect on the level of subsidization activity the firm will be encouraged to provide. 
Interest groups and voters will not be equally motivated to obtain subsidies from the same 
firms with the same level of interest. The five firms that Kole and Muhlerin target to determine 
effect of government ownership on growth are American Potash, American Bosch, General 
Aniline and Film, Rohm & Haas, and Schering. Id. at 9–10. One was an engine parts 
manufacturer, another was a commercial solvents manufacturer. The mean number of 
employees at these firms was 2,810. See id. at 10. By contrast, the mean number of employees 
of the top TARP recipients is much larger, thus creating a more powerful interest group 
feedback loop in TARP recipients than in the five firms focused on in the Kole and Mulhern 
inquiry. For example, AIG has 96,000 employees. See CNNMONEY.COM, http:// 
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/snapshots/2469.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2011). The unique thing about both the banking and automotive industries is that 
they serve as a potential subsidy vehicle for nearly every household that buys a car or owns a 
home. By using a bank to encourage lowering interest rates, the government can directly 
transfer wealth to those households without needing to recognize the transfer on the 
government’s books and without facing a challenge from the bank. 
 66. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government 
Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=309161. 
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generously, compared to private banks, during election years.67 One 
empirical examination of state-owned banks in Italy found that, all 
else equal, state-owned banks charge an average of 44 basis points 
less than privately held banks for the same borrower.68 This study 
also found that companies in certain political regions lent money at 
different rates, with regions in which the national political party held 
more power likely to experience lower interest rates from the state 
owned banks than other areas.69 
Other studies directly compare the efficiency of government-
owned firms to that of private firms. Boardman and Vining point to 
 
 67. I. Serdar Dinç, Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-Owned 
Banks in Emerging Markets, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 435 (2005). 
 68. Paola Sapienza, What do State-Owned Firms Maximize? Evidence from Italian 
Banks 3 (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=303381. 
 69. Id. Sapienza has also found that government run banks in Italy lend at rates 
approximately 20 to 50 basis points lower than private banks. Id. at 11–14. The case of India’s 
bank nationalization is also instructive. See Shawn A. Cole, Financial Development, Bank 
Ownership, and Growth. Or, Does Quantity Imply Quality? 23 (Harvard Business Sch., Working 
Paper No. 09-002, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1158078. “In 1980, the 
government of India nationalized all private banks with a deposit base above Rs. 2 billion.” Id. 
at 2. Those banks were subject to direct control of the federal government, with the entire 
board of directors nominated by the ruling party. Id. at 7. Between the nationalization of 1969 
and 2000 “there were twenty-one private bank failures in India. Banarjee, Cole and Duflo 
[found] that the cost to the government of making whole depositors in [those] failed banks 
was less than the cost of recapitalizing public sector banks,” after adjusting for scale. Id. at 8 
(citing Abhijit V. Banerjee, Shawn Cole & Esther Duflo, Banking Reform in India, 1 INDIA 
POL’Y F. 273 (2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/global/ipf/banerjee_ 
cole_duflo.pdf). The identified goal of the Indian nationalization was to increase the scope of 
banking and lending in rural areas. Id. at 19. This rural focus was intended to benefit lower 
income groups, and by association the agriculture industry. Id. at 22. The effect of the Indian 
nationalization was that nationalized banks grew more slowly than private banks in the 1990s, 
and that they lent more to agricultural, rural areas, and to the government at the expense of 
lending to trade, transport, and the financial industry. Id. at 13. Cole found that towns with 
nationalized branches experienced an annual growth rate of 2–3% higher than rural towns 
without nationalized branches during 1980–1990, and the amount of credit in those towns 
increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2.5. Id. at 20. He also found, however, that the effect of 
increased credit on rural towns was not a sustained impact, as the annual growth rate in towns 
with nationalized banks was 2–4% lower from 1990–2000, essentially wiping out the prior 
decade’s additional growth. Id. This suggests that the additional liquidity was merely invested 
in bad loans. Nationalization also resulted in a significant reallocation of lending to agriculture 
as well as lower interest rates. Id. at 21–24. Government ownership also reduced the quality of 
financial intermediation as evidenced by the fact that loans made by public sector banks were 
substantially more likely to default than loans issued by private sector banks, eventually 
resulting in a substantial drain on the public treasury when the national government eventually 
recapitalized them. Id. at 23. Further, Indian bank nationalization failed to even attain its 
modest goal of increased employment or increased investment in the agricultural sector over 
the long term, despite the high cost of nationalization. Id. at 24–27.  
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a large body of literature which studies the efficiency of government-
owned firms as compared to private firms.70 They construct a model 
that examines 500 state-owned, mixed-ownership, and private 
companies operating internationally in competitive environments, 
and find that on average state-owned enterprises have a return on 
equity that is 12 percent less than private companies.71 They also 
note that the firms in their study were not nationalized as a result of 
poor performance, thus removing bailout as a reason for the lower 
value of government-owned firms.72 They also note that performance 
of mixed-ownership companies tended to be worse than state-owned 
companies, leading to a suggestion that partial nationalization can 
actually be worse than full nationalization.73 
Various studies on privatization of state-owned enterprises offer a 
useful comparison for the costs of government ownership, 
particularly as many of those studies indicate that privatization makes 
state owned firms run more efficiently.74 Thus we can indirectly get a 
view for how government shareholders operate by considering how 
the value of the firm changes after the government closes its 
ownership position. A study of Russian privatization indicates that 
firms in which the government kept residual equity ownership 
received preferential treatment in the application of government 
regulations over firms that were not government owned, magnifying 
the distorting effects of government ownership.75 This is similar to 
the exemption from the federal securities laws that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were able to obtain for so long, as well as Wallison’s 
suspicion that they received preferential treatment in application of 
the antitrust laws. 
 
 
 70. Anthony E. Boardman & Aidan R. Vining, Ownership and Performance in 
Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed and State-
Owned Enterprises, 32 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4–5 (1989) (noting that much of the investigation is 
skewed by the fact that most of the industries are Western, in which most government owned 
firms are intensely regulated industries, particularly utilities, which limit their application to a 
study of government versus privately owned firms in more competitive environments).  
 71. Boardman & Vining, supra note 70, at 17. 
 72. Id. at 23. 
 73. Id. at 26. 
 74. William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of 
Empirical Studies on Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 321, 380 (2001). 
 75. Daniel Berkowitz & Yadviga Semikolenova, Privatization with Government Control: 
Evidence from the Russian Oil Sector 22 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 826, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=920509. 
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Direct nationalization offers more concrete control for the 
government. Unions are the stakeholder most likely to seek influence 
in a government owned firm.76 One of the reasons why nationalized, 
or even partially nationalized, firms are difficult to then re-privatize is 
that stakeholders obtain patronage networks from the firm through 
political influence; thus privatization requires a substantial political 
battle.77 Study of nationalization and privatization is thus useful in 
considering the Treasury’s equity holdings, but the best analogy for 
the semi-nationalization created by the Treasury’s TARP holdings is 
the case of nationalized firms in which governments maintain 
significant and powerful residual holdings. Those residual holdings 
were particularly characterized by the power to block acquisitions, 
known as golden shares.78 Those governments’ residual holdings also 
 
 76. See Aaron Tornell, Privatizing the Privatized 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. W7206, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=202743. 
 77. See id. One of the political explanations for privatization in late twentieth century 
Britain was that the conservative government was interested in allocating underpriced equity to 
the middle class through privatization, which would then create a constituency that would 
support market oriented policies and thereby increase the Conservatives’ chance of reelection. 
See Bernardo Bortolotti & Mara Faccio, Government Control of Privatized Firms, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2907, 2926 (2009). In effect, the privatization itself would give voters more of a stake 
in the profitability of the enterprise, thereby ensuring that they would support government 
policies supportive of the business management already allied with the conservative 
government. In the United States, this motive for privatization would not likely hold because 
equity holdings are already widely distributed among the middle class. And so, at the very least, 
pointing to Europe as justification for the fact that governments can be forced to induce 
privatization of firms they have run may be troublesome. The only other inducement to 
privatization we have seen is that governments can be induced to divest themselves of 
profitable firms if the public budget is in severe stress. See id. at 2928. This implies that only 
banks in which interest group rents do not capture all of the firm’s profits could be later 
privatized by the Treasury. But even when they do privatize, that privatization may be only 
partial. Governments face pressure to maintain powerful residual ownership in the privatized 
firms. The Russian privatization experience also supports the idea that privatization is more 
likely when the government is suffering from severe budget deficits. See Muravyev, supra note 
62, at 12. Russian firms with residual government ownership were also characterized by the 
presence of government officials in administrative and board positions. Id. at 14. Those 
representatives had little experience in the underlying business. Id. 
 78. See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as 
Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private 
Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801, 1807 (2008); see also Bortolotti & Faccio, supra note 
77, at 2908, 2918–19; Jullian Ellison & Duncan Reed, Getting Tough on Golden Shares, FIN. 
TIMES, June 6, 2003. During the privatization wave of the 1980s and 90s in Western Europe, 
governments sold off majority stakes in airlines, automotive and other manufacturers, banks, 
utilities, and a variety of other industries. Many of them kept shares that included provisions 
that permitted the holder to block any merger or acquisition of the newly privatized company. 
See Bortolotti & Faccio, supra note 77, at 2907–09. Though these shares represented minority 
positions in those firms, the ability to veto mergers gave state investors a powerful voice in the 
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gave them the ability to also influence major corporate policy 
decisions.79 
It is also interesting to note that nearly two-thirds of privatized 
firms in Europe during the great privatization wave of the 1980s and 
1990s, from a sample including firms privatized prior to 1996, were 
characterized by this form of powerful residual government 
control.80 This indicates that once American banks have come under 
government control for the purposes of running them as enterprises, 
even if they can later be re-privatized, the Treasury may also be 
expected to maintain for the federal government residual interests 
whose control exceeds their proportionate interest. The 
consequences of residual golden shares can threaten the profitability 
of the partially privatized firm.81 One study found that more fully 
privatized firms tended to be more profitable than those in which 
governments had powerful residual equity holdings, with market-to-
book and return-on-equity ratios negatively correlated with a 
decreased level of privatization.82  
One may argue that the market for equity and debt in mixed-
ownership firms would limit the firm’s freedom of action to accede 
to government mandates that reduce profit. However, two unique 
 
company’s decision-making. Id. Many argue that those governments used their rights in 
golden shares to block legitimate offers to acquire those companies out of an interest in 
maintaining inefficiently high levels of employment or reducing cross-border flows of capital 
and services. For instance, France and Germany have been the subject of extensive litigation 
before the European Commission over their golden shares in, for instance, Airbus and 
Volkswagen. These golden shares typically possessed powers, among which were “(1) the right 
to appoint members to corporate boards; (2) the right to consent to or veto the acquisition of 
relevant interests in the privatized companies; and (3) other rights . . . to consent to . . . 
ordinary management” changes. Id. at 2918. Those European governments with the right to 
appoint directors frequently appointed government officials to the board. See id. at 2919. 
 79. See Bortolotti and Faccio, supra note 77, at 2907–08. 
 80. See id. at 2909. 
 81. One might ask why constituents of the corporation would lobby for policies which 
may threaten the long term profitability, and by extension the long term viability, of the 
corporation from which they seek to extract rents. But even with its interest in general public 
welfare, rather than profit maximization, the opportunity costs of employees who were never 
employed in industry, that otherwise may have been under competitive pricing, or the 
opportunity costs of shareholder returns to private pensions that do not otherwise accrue as a 
result of the price controls, are not factored into the analysis. These hidden costs cannot make 
their way through the political process to exert pressure because actors who would otherwise 
lobby for these opportunities, like future stockholders or future consumers, do not know of 
their potential interest ahead of time. And so, as an interest group, they are unable to organize 
to protect their interest.  
 82. See Bortolotti & Faccio, supra note 77, at 23. 
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aspects of mixed-ownership firms distort that mechanism, and they 
are readily observable in the case of the government-sponsored 
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As a particularly egregious 
example of how Fannie and Freddie’s operational risks were ignored 
by private markets due to the government’s backing, Fannie and 
Freddie were not permitted to file financial statements with the SEC 
starting in 2003 due to revelations of earnings manipulations and 
accounting fraud.83 And yet, during the years that investors had no 
access to filed financial statements, the demand for Fannie and 
Freddie debt continued unabated.84 Although, Fannie and Freddie 
were originally chartered by Congress as federal agencies, they were 
later privatized by a sale of equity in their operations to private 
shareholders in order to ensure that their purchases and sales of 
mortgages could be removed from the federal budget.85 
Nonetheless, members of Congress expected Fannie and Freddie to 
subsidize low-income borrowers.86  
Merely increasing regulation of government owned businesses 
will not sufficiently limit the moral hazard problems attending the 
government’s guarantee.87 As Federal Reserve chairman Alan 
Greenspan observed at the time, increased regulation of an implicitly 
governmentally guaranteed enterprise only enhances the market’s 
perception that the government is all the more willing to guarantee 
its debt.88 Indeed, prior to the revelations of accounting irregularities 
at the two GSEs, its dedicated regulator performed the sort of 
inspections and audits typical of a financial regulator without 
uncovering any problems, particularly at Freddie Mac.89 
In order to deal with these challenges, this Article will now 
examine a new solution suggesting the use of government financial 
statements and a method of determining the statutory debt ceiling to 
counter the government’s incentives to use its investment in private 
 
 83. Wallison, Moral Hazards, supra note 43, at 2.  
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. at 2. See also Amity Shlaes, Fannie Mae’s Demise Rooted in the Swinging ‘60s, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 10, 2008, 12:01 AM) http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&refer=columnist_shlaes&sid=ab3S57i4MOtw.  
 86. Wallison, Moral Hazards, supra note 43, at 3. See also Charles W. Calomiris & Peter 
J. Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress for the Credit Mess, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008, 
at A29. 
 87. Wallison, Moral Hazards, supra note 43, at 5. 
 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. See Wallison, The Evolution of a Policy Idea, supra note 43, at 14. 
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companies to facilitate off-balance sheet subsidies. This solution will 
seek to achieve three goals: 1) limit the government’s incentive to 
bail out troubled firms, particularly by methods that involve taking a 
controlling equity position; 2) give the government an incentive to 
close out its position in bailed-out entities in which it ends up taking 
equity; and 3) present an accurate picture of the value of 
government’s holdings and its obligations associated with those 
holdings, and how that value affects the government’s overall 
financial picture. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL BUDGETARY LAW AND ACCOUNTING 
APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS 
There are two international cases that provide useful precedent in 
figuring out how to account for the U.S. government’s investment 
in TARP recipients regarding the various financial legal and 
accounting mechanisms that govern and disclose government 
expenditures and financial borrowing. The United Kingdom bailed 
out its two largest banks, Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”) and 
Lloyds, by way of equity injections in much the same manner used 
by the United States. Yet, the U.K. accounted for that bailout in a 
distinctly different manner from the United States. This Section will 
look into the reasons for the U.K.’s approach in comparison to the 
current U.S. method of bailout accounting. Additionally, New 
Zealand recently undertook a wholly new method to account for its 
government owned corporations, and this policy shift will also be 
examined. That such closely analogous common law and advanced 
economy analogues would account for their bailouts so differently 
from the United States calls the current U.S. approach into question. 
The U.K. took a 100% interest in Northern Rock, an 
approximately 84% interest in RBS, and an approximately 43% equity 
interest in Lloyds Banking Group.90 To purchase the RBS shares, 
Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury reports having paid 46 billion 
pounds.91 It paid 23 billion pounds for its shares in Lloyds and 20 
billion pounds for its ownership of Northern Rock by way of a 
 
 90. See NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER AND AUDITOR 
GENERAL: MAINTAINING FINANCIAL STABILITY ACROSS THE UNITED KINGDOM’S BANKING 
SYSTEM, 2009–10, H.C. 91, at 37 (U.K.), available at http://www.nao.org.uk/ 
idoc.ashx?docId=99ee9a41-99a2-4cbb-b7b1-df61f035e427&version=-1. 
 91. Id. at 38. 
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combination capital injection and loan.92 In November 2009, the 
Treasury announced that future capital injections of up to 39 billion 
pounds were anticipated for Lloyds and RBS.93 
Much like the U.S. approach, the U.K. bank recapitalization 
took the form of capital injections in exchange for preferred stock.94 
Akin to the approach the Federal Reserve took in managing its 
investment in AIG, the U.K. set up the U.K. Financial Investments 
Ltd. (“UK FIL”), a quasi-independent company set up to manage 
the government’s equity in bailed-out banks.95 Unlike the United 
States, however, the U.K. Office of National Statistics (“ONS”) 
determined that the UK FIL should be classified as part of the U.K. 
government.96 The ONS noted that the public financial sector 
corporations on the U.K. balance sheet would now include RBS, 
Lloyds, Northern Rock, and Bradford and Bingley.97 It estimated 
that the effect on public sector net debt would be an increase of 1.5 
trillion pounds.98 This was roughly equivalent to 100% of the U.K.’s 
GDP.99  
In its decision to classify these four companies as public sector 
concerns, the ONS relied on the European System of Accounts 1995 
(“ESA95”), part of the body of rules that governs European public 
sector accounting.100 That standard requires the U.K. to consolidate 
onto the national debt the debt of companies over which it exercises 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 5. 
 94. See MARTIN KELLAWAY, OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, PUBLIC SECTOR 
INTERVENTIONS IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 61 (U.K.) (2009), available at http:// 
www.statistics.gov.uk/articles/nojournal/Financial-crisis.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC SECTOR 
INTERVENTIONS]. 
 95. Id. at 62–63. 
 96. Id. at 63. The ONS is charged with producing the U.K.’s National Accounts 
Estimate, an internationally accepted accounting framework, and the U.K. government as well 
as the European Union base their fiscal policy frameworks on the National Accounts. See id. at 
4. These estimates are used in the Maastricht Treaty measures to determine Stability and 
Growth Pact compliance for eurozone members, and also used to measure Gross National 
Income to determine an EU members required contribution to the EU budget. Id. The U.K. 
government also bases its fiscal policy objectives on the National Accounts Estimates 
promulgated by the ONS. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1. 
 98. Id. 
 99. The U.K.’s GDP in 2010 was 1.47 trillion. See UK Gross Domestic Product GDP 
History, UK PUB. SPENDING, http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_gdp_history (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2011). 
 100. See PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVENTIONS, supra note 94, at 5. 
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effective control.101 Listed as factors that supported the ONS 
determination that Northern Rock should be classified as a public 
sector institution as of October 2007 (prior to its full nationalization 
in February 2008) were that, according to its agreement with the 
Bank of England (“BOE”), it had to obtain permission from the 
BOE “before entering into any corporate restructuring, making 
substantial changes to the general nature of the business, making 
dividend payments, and acquiring or disposing of certain types of 
assets.”102 The ONS noted that, as of 2008, the government’s 
ownership and right to appoint directors made the classification 
question even clearer.103  
The ONS determined that RBS and Lloyds, and their subsidiary 
companies, should be classified as public sector entities starting 
October 2008 based on its judgment that “government has the 
ability to control the respective banks’ general corporate policy 
through the conditions associated with the agreements signed 
relating to recapitalization.”104 Those agreements included provisions 
 
 101. ESA95 notes that control is the basis for consolidating private companies into the 
public sector, defining control as: 
[T]he ability to determine general corporate policy by choosing appropriate 
directors, if necessary. 
A single institutional unit . . . secures control over a corporation by owning more 
than half the voting shares or otherwise controlling more than half the shareholders’ 
voting power. In addition, government secures control over a corporation as a result 
of special legislation decree or regulation which empowers the government to 
determine corporate policy or to appoint the directors. 
Id. at 6 (quoting Council Regulation, 1996, O.J. 2223/96 (L 310) ¶ 2.26). The ONS also 
mentioned that: 
ONS National Accounts classification case law uses an assessment of a number of 
control indicators to form a judgment on whether there is control. This is a similar 
approach to business accounting, which recognizes that companies can be 
controlled other than through the majority ownership of voting share capital. 
Id. at 7. Accordingly, the ONS states its method for determining whether to consolidate 
partially government-owned companies into the public sector balance sheet as follows: 
The ONS approach to classification cases involving the public sector is to first 
consider whether government, or any other part of the public sector, can exercise 
control or influence over an entity’s directors through the appointments process. It 
then examines the situation to see whether there are any special factors or 
contractual arrangements that enabled any part of the public sector to determine 
general corporate policy, either individually or collectively. 
Id.  
 102. Id. at 15. 
 103. Id. at 16. 
 104. News Release, Office for National Statistics, Classification of Royal Bank of Scotland 
Group plc and Lloyds Banking Group plc (February 19, 2009), available at 
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with restrictions on the declaration and payment of dividends or 
distributions, director pay, and obligations relating to lending.105 
Even when Lloyds redeemed its preference shares from the 
government in June 2009 and its dividend restrictions were lifted, 
the ONS still maintained its classification as a public sector entity for 
these purposes because the other restrictions remained in effect.106  
The factors on which the ONS relied in requiring consolidation 
of private bank debt into the U.K.’s debt largely mirror the 
restrictions included in the preferred shares and capital injection 
agreements of TARP recipients in the United States. The ONS did 
note, however, that it would not consolidate the operations of RBS 
and Lloyds into the public sector current budget.107 This Article will 
argue that the United States should follow the U.K.’s lead in 
consolidating debt of bailed-out companies into the national debt. 
In July of 1989, the New Zealand Parliament passed the Public 
Finance Act requiring Royal Departments to consolidate state-owned 
enterprises into the government’s financial reporting and budget 
process.108 The policy debate in implementing that mandate provides 
informative precedent for dealing with the post-bailout holdings of 
the Treasury and Federal Reserve, as well as the Government 
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) under federal conservatorship. 
In deciding how to account for its investments in government-
owned enterprises, one of the concerns raised in New Zealand was 
that consolidation would raise skepticism from the private sector 
because of the government’s assertion that it would not guarantee 
private firm debt, which would itself perhaps increase interest rates of 
sovereign debt.109 If this is true, then attendant private sector 
skepticism is a policy goal favored by the analysis in this Article. 
Governments tend to give added backing to bailed-out entities, and 
consolidation would offer yet another incentive to the government 
to avoid bailing out an entity in the first place. 
 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/crbslbg0209.pdf. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVENTIONS, supra note 94, at 78–79. 
 107. See id. at 72. 
 108. See Sonja Pont Newby, Consolidation Accounting: A History of the Development of 
Financial Reporting Standard FRS-37 and Sector-Neutral Consolidation Accounting for 
Crown Financial Reporting by the New Zealand Government 108 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of Canterbury), available at http://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/bitstream/10092/ 
868/1/thesis.fulltext.pdf. 
 109. Id. at 167. 
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Another argument raised against consolidation in the New 
Zealand case was that it may give the government further control 
over the accounting policies of government companies because the 
Treasury could use the argument of the necessity of consistency in 
reporting to mandate that the company adopt certain accounting 
policies, thus furthering government control over the company.110 In 
order to address this concern in the U.S. case, any implementing 
legislation would need to affirm that GAAP rulemaking would 
remain independent of the Treasury Department. 
Still another argument raised against full consolidation was that 
the policies put into place by the government to limit its ability to 
direct management of state-owned enterprises advocated separating 
the two in financial reporting.111 Otherwise, consolidating the two 
may provide an inappropriate means of monitoring the relationship 
between the government as an investor and the business running 
under some measure of independence. These advocates instead 
argued for using the equity method to account for the government’s 
ownership.112 This was in effect an accuracy of disclosure argument, 
and no doubt a similar argument will be raised in the United States 
concerning the policies articulated in the Treasury Department’s 
white paper on voting equity in TARP recipients. 
In determining whether the existence of a trust eliminated a 
finding of control, the applicable Australian Accounting Standard 
used as precedent by New Zealand found that where a trust is 
guided by a fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiary, the beneficiary is 
likely in control of the assets held by the trust.113 If the United States 
followed a similar approach, it would consolidate its investment in 
AIG despite the existence of the AIG Trust because the trust 
explicitly defines the Treasury Department as the beneficiary. 
Once New Zealand passed its law requiring consolidation, the 
final question its Treasury had to consider in deciding how to 
account for its substantial Crown (government) investments in 
standalone companies was whether to utilize the equity method or 
full consolidation.114 New Zealand decided to abandon use of the 
 
 110. See id. at 139. 
 111. Id. at 116. 
 112. See id. at 117–18. 
 113. See id. at 177.  
 114. See id. at 85. See infra Part VI for a summary of the differences between the equity 
and full consolidation methods of accounting for ownership in subsidiaries. 
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equity method in favor of full consolidation for its government 
owned enterprises.115 
These two countries demonstrate the unique nature of the U.S. 
government’s approach to accounting for its holdings in 
government-owned companies. The debt calculation and accounting 
systems governing the United States are unique, due in part to its 
three-branch governmental system. Yet the U.S. government’s 
decision not to consolidate its holdings in any way is without 
precedent. And the separation of powers and three-branch system 
written into the U.S. Constitution actually provide an even more 
forceful argument for consolidation than the U.K. and New Zealand 
systems, as the next Section will demonstrate. 
V. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR THE NATIONAL DEBT 
CEILING 
The Constitution encourages separation of powers in the 
borrowing and repayment of money. Article I specifically grants to 
Congress the power “to pay the debts . . . of the United States”116 
and “to borrow money on the credit of the United States.”117 In 
order to facilitate its legislative function of overseeing the debt, 
Congress passed the Debt Limit Statute, also known as the debt 
ceiling.118 The Debt Limit Statute is Congress’s way of fulfilling 
these two required Constitutional functions of overseeing the 
borrowing and repayment of the public debt.119 If government 
deficit spending requires borrowing above a specified debt limit, 
called the debt ceiling, “Congress must enact a law to raise the 
ceiling.”120 At present, the government’s debt ceiling statute states 
that “[t]he face amount of obligations issued under this chapter and 
the face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are 
guaranteed by the United States Government . . . may not be more 
 
 115. Newby, supra note 108, at 204. 
 116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.  
 118. Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288 (codified as 
amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2000)). 
 119. Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
135, 136–37 (2005) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 120. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 105TH CONG., THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS: 
AN EXPLANATION 4 (Comm. Print 1998), available at http://budget.senate.gov/ 
republican/major_documents/budgetprocess.pdf [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
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than $14,294,000,000,000, outstanding at one time, subject to 
changes periodically made in that amount as provided by law 
through the congressional budget process.”121 The intent behind the 
Debt Limit Statute was to grant the Secretary of the Treasury the 
authority to issue debt periodically, up to a specified limit, and 
require that the Administration return to Congress periodically to 
obtain authorization for additional borrowing.122 Although the list of 
items included in the referenced chapter does not currently 
enumerate debt issued by companies controlled by the U.S. 
government, this Article will argue that it should include the debt 
held by such companies. 
If the executive branch is allowed to use its controlling stake in 
private companies to borrow money for the purposes of subsidies 
and policy outcomes which the executive may otherwise need to seek 
Congressional approval to achieve, then Congress’s ability to oversee 
borrowing and debt repayment is diminished. If, as is the case with 
many of the TARP recipients and Fannie and Freddie, those private 
companies continue to borrow with the implicit backing of the 
United States, then separation of powers with respect to borrowing 
and paying debts is entirely sidestepped. One phenomenon which 
indicates the implicit backing of banks is the low discounts of private 
bank debt in relation to the decreases in their stock price.123  
One approach to consolidation would be to net the assets of 
TARP firms against their debt, and report the balance. This was not 
the approach taken by the U.K.124 One policy reason not to net the 
debt against the assets of TARP recipients when consolidating them 
into the debt ceiling estimate is that it could leave the government 
with an incentive to keep some firms under government control, in 
the event that assets exceeded debt at those firms. The Debt Limit 
Statute itself does not include a method for consolidating the debt of 
the United States against its assets, but instead directly limits the 
gross outstanding debt of the United States without any mention of 
assets in the statute.125 The fact that very little attention is paid to 
assets held by the United States in the Debt Limit Statute is, from a 
constitutional perspective, consistent with evidence from the 
 
 121. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (West 2010). 
 122. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 136.  
 123. See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2, at 258.  
 124. See PUBLIC SECTOR INTERVENTIONS, supra note 94, at 1. 
 125. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (West 2010). 
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Federalist papers demonstrating the Founders’ fixation with paying 
off, and minimizing, debt held by the government. Federalist No. 7, 
written by Alexander Hamilton, the first Treasury Secretary of the 
United States, reveals an important concern underlying the debt 
clauses of the Constitution.126 
One of the very real consequences of the Debt Limit Statute, and 
its requirement that the Treasury obtain periodic approval for 
increases in the debt limit, has been that negotiations over legislation 
to increase the debt limit have led to compromises that have 
spawned significant balanced-budget and budgetary reform 
legislation aimed at reducing the size and growth of the national 
debt.127 During the 1960s, Congress used votes on increases in the 
debt ceiling to push for budgetary reform from the executive 
branch.128 Members of Congress felt the sting of the debt ceiling 
votes quite acutely, and were subject to harsh criticism during re-
election.129 Debt ceiling increases were frequently voted down as a 
result of this pressure.130 Pressure was felt so acutely that, for a short 
period, the House passed the Gephart Rule, which automatically 
 
 126. It states: 
The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the 
separate States or confederacies. The apportionment, in the first instance, and the 
progressive extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and 
animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment 
satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can be proposed which is entirely free 
from real objections. These, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest 
of the parties. There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general 
principle of discharging the public debt. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton) “The citizens of the States interested would 
clamour; foreign powers would urge for the satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of 
the States would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and internal 
contention.” Id. And later, it urges that the new Constitution, “must embrace a provision . . . 
for the payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, 
for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national treasury.” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton). At the Convention, delegate Sherman urged that 
“[t]he national debt & the want of power somewhere to draw forth the National resources, are 
the great matters that press.” JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 160 (1966). 
 127. See Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 138. (“[A]lthough [the Debt Limit Statute’s] 
existence has not stopped the trend towards increased borrowing, it has slowed that trend by 
acting as a catalyst for budget-reform and budget-balance measures aimed at reducing national 
borrowing.”). 
 128. Id. at 152. 
 129. Id. at 153. 
 130. Id. (citing H.R. 12641, 95th Cong. (1978) (vote to raise debt ceiling to $849 
billion which was voted down 167-228)). 
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enrolled a bill for submission, without a separate vote by the House, 
to the Senate extending the debt ceiling whenever a series of budget 
resolutions resulted in a projected increase in the debt sufficient to 
violate the existing debt ceiling.131 In 1985, a coalition of Democrats 
and Republicans strategically used the required vote on whether to 
raise the debt ceiling to pass the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit 
Reduction Act, which was a legislative mechanism to cap budget 
deficit ceilings for the following five years and thereby reduce deficit 
spending.132 In particular, during the period from 1995 to 2002 the 
Gephart Rule was waived every year as Congress has embraced votes 
on the debt ceiling as an opportunity to push for deficit reduction 
and balanced budget legislation.133 The proposed Balanced Budget 
Constitutional Amendment from the 1990s would have also used 
the national debt ceiling to maintain a new constitutional limit on 
spending.134 One such iteration would have required a three-fifths 
vote of each house of Congress to approve an increase in the debt 
ceiling.135 One of the results of consolidation, depending on the 
accounting method chosen, could be to have a balance sheet 
eliminating inter-entity balances for the duration of the 
consolidation.136 For instance, amounts owed by Citi to the federal 
government and Treasury bonds held by Citi would be eliminated 
from the government’s budget, financial statements, and debt ceiling 
estimate. 
Krishnakumar presents both an interest group theory and 
decision theory in support of the debt ceiling statute that are even 
more applicable in the case of controlled bank debt than in the more 
general case she analyzed.137 Krishnakumar builds her analysis on 
work by Posner, Arrow, and others which argue that decisions which 
we might consider to be built on majoritarian ideas are in fact a 
product of interest group coalitions that lead to outcomes which a 
majority of the electorate would otherwise vote against if given the 
 
 131. Id. at 153. 
 132. Id. at 154–55. 
 133. Id. at 156 & n.135. 
 134. Id. at 156. 
 135. H.R.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 136. Cf. Newby, supra note 108, at 120 (quoting a joint paper prepared by the OAG, the 
British State Services Commission, and the British Treasury suggesting that this was one 
possible accounting method for Crown and sub-entity balance sheets). 
 137. See Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 160–62. 
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opportunity to vote on each individual item.138 Average citizens thus 
have their interests diffused, such that they suffer from collective 
action constraints in their ability to form coalitions to lobby for or 
against legislation. This is contrasted to tightly formed minority 
interest groups for whom an investment in lobbying is a wise 
investment.139 Krishnakumar in part relies on Arrow’s theorem that 
“decisions made by majority vote in Congress are not truly 
majoritarian” because they are more a function of the rules 
governing presentation, debate, and the voting structure of policy 
choices.140 Krishnakumar also notes that party control of the budget 
process can lead to logrolling in budget decisions,141 which in turn 
can influence decisions about subsidies to individual interest groups 
which may override a focus on the overall size of the budget deficit 
and the national debt. Krishnakumar also argues that a shift in the 
House from committee chairmanships based on seniority to those 
based on majority election every session by the majority caucus has 
limited the selection of safe-district, senior members who had room 
to focus on the national interest rather than maintaining their 
chairmanships and their seats.142 
The debt ceiling’s requirement that Congress hold a recorded 
vote to periodically increase it helps restore the accountability 
mechanism that is diminished by the interest group dominance of 
the ordinary budget and appropriations process. One of the most 
important reasons why the interest groups who should be most 
concerned about the size of the national debt are not able to 
influence the budget process is because they do not yet exist. Most 
of the generations of taxpayers who will eventually pay off the 
national debt through taxes are not yet born or old enough to vote. 
Even the generation of younger voters who could potentially have an 
interest in the future deficit would be overpowered by the more 
cogently formed interest groups with a stronger interest in 
government subsidies.  
 
 138. See id. at 160–62 & nn.158–162. 
 139. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265–66 (1982). 
 140. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 161 (citing Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, 
The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 903 (1987)). 
 141. Id. at 161 & n.162 (citing Neal E. Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of 
Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 993, 994, 997 (1990)). 
 142. Id. at 162. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 12:45 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
426 
Evidence suggests that “yes” votes on increasing the debt ceiling 
were used against incumbents in election campaigns in the 1970s 
and that, predictably, members of Congress were reluctant to vote in 
favor of the debt ceiling; indeed, that concern was the purpose 
behind the Gephart Rule, which was passed to provide political cover 
on debt limit votes.143 The Gephart Rule was frequently waived after 
this period as a result of influence by members of Congress who 
themselves were interested in using the disciplinary power of the 
debt ceiling vote to keep spending down.144  
 Krishnakumar observes that the debt ceiling vote actually 
functions as an anti-logrolling vote.145 Individual interest groups are 
less galvanized to lobby for an increase in the debt ceiling because 
the link between their interest and the increased spending is difficult 
to distinguish among the thousands of spending compromises that 
eventually constitute the budget process and in any event, the link is 
usually temporally distant.146 Thus, even if failure to pass an increase 
in the debt ceiling will result in a required reduction in expenditures, 
interest groups will be unable to determine at the time of that vote 
whether that will equate to a reduction in their particular project.147 
That uncertainty limits their incentive to lobby the vote. Indeed, 
Krishnakumar notes that interest groups may have reason to fear 
supporting an overall increase in the debt limit, as it may brand them 
negatively.148 Where they could link their spending increase to 
supporting their cause, interest group support of runaway debt could 
limit their own ability to recruit new members or maintain links with 
congressional members that may support special interest funding 
projects as an exception to their overall interest voting against 
increases in the debt ceiling.149 
One of the reasons why a vote on the debt ceiling may be a more 
useful accountability mechanism than the accumulated voting record 
of a member could relate to work on voter ignorance. Voters have 
been shown to have little understanding of complex policy decisions, 
and in particular have rational incentives to remain ignorant because 
 
 143. See id. at 153–56, 179–80. 
 144. See id. at 156 & n.135. 
 145. See id. at 178–179. 
 146. See id. at 166–67. 
 147. See id.  
 148. Id. at 166. 
 149. See id. at 161–68. 
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of the cost of learning.150 But a decision to raise the debt ceiling is a 
simple one, and one that overarches the accumulation of spending 
policy decisions that make up the budget process.  
Krishnakumar also argues that the debt ceiling vote permits 
legislators more time to deliberate over the long-term consequences 
of government debt than the rushed budget process affords.151 This 
notion would be even more important in the context of bailed-out 
companies. When legislators initially considered the TARP bailout, 
they were faced with an impending market panic, and indeed many 
have asserted that their second vote in favor of the bailout was 
influenced by a substantial decline in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average just after their initial vote against it.152 One could expect 
future bailouts to be structured similarly to this one, since there will 
always be pressure to take equity in bailed-out companies, with the 
argument that the taxpayer should be allowed to participate in any 
future upside to the bailed-out firm. But after the bailout is 
executed—and if future bailouts are structured similarly to the last 
one, where the decision of when to divest of equity was left to the 
executive branch—the legislative branch will similarly be unable to 
reconsider the bailout or force the government to sell off companies 
that make for useful subsidy devices. But if, as a consequence of the 
bailout, Congress is required to hold a vote on the debt ceiling 
earlier than it would otherwise, then Congress gains both the 
incentive and the opportunity to push the executive branch to divest 
its interest in the bailed-out firm. Further, at that time, Congress 
would have an opportunity to deliberate over the wisdom of 
continued government ownership without needing to do so in the 
midst of a market crisis. 
One important aspect of the debt ceiling vote is that it is not 
typically used as a vehicle for other legislation, but rather is passed in 
clean form.153 For example, from 1978–2002, there were relatively 
few debt ceiling votes that included one or more substantial 
amendments, and almost all of these rider amendments were directly 
related to the national debt, such as balanced budget provisions and 
 
 150. See Ilya Somin, Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal, 12 CRITICAL REV. 413 
(1998). 
 151. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 167. 
 152. Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further, 
WALL ST. J. , Oct. 4, 2008, at A1. 
 153. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 172. 
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the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; only four of the forty-two debt-
limit increase bills had non-debt-related riders attached.154  
Critics of the debt ceiling argue that it risks perilous 
consequences if the President and Congress are not able to come to 
a consensus on the debt ceiling and thus force the United States into 
default on its debt obligations.155 Abramowicz argues that the Debt 
Limit Statute is dangerous because it creates the threat that Congress 
will default on its debts, it thereby gives Congress excess leverage in 
negotiations with the President.156 It is precisely this threat of serious 
consequences that is required to limit the executive branch’s 
temptation to use its interest in TARP recipients for political ends. It 
can ultimately give Congress both the incentive and the leverage to 
push the Administration to cut spending. Krishnakumar points out, 
however, that, in the eighty-six year history of the debt ceiling 
preceding the writing of her article, the United States has never 
defaulted on its debt.157 But even if that criticism of the debt ceiling 
were to hold in the general case, it would be muted in the context of 
this paper’s argument, as the President would have an easy 
alternative to obtaining congressional approval. He could instead sell 
off the private companies controlled by the government, and thereby 
reduce the national debt and put off the need to increase the debt 
ceiling until the other public debt rose up to that level. 
As the national debt nears the debt ceiling, Treasury Secretaries 
find themselves in the unenviable position of scurrying to move 
funds around in order to temporarily maintain the government’s 
finances. One method readily available to the Treasury Secretary is to 
manipulate its pension funds for government retirees.158 This, 
however, buys the administration only a small window of time. If, 
however, the Treasury Secretary had the option of divesting federal 
holdings in government controlled private businesses, it would open 
a much larger window for Treasury to delay the required vote on the 
debt ceiling.159  
 
 154. Id. at 172–73. 
 155. Id. at 175. 
 156. See Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 
TULSA L.J. 561, 579 (1997). 
 157. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 175. 
 158. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-526, DEBT CEILING: ANALYSIS 
OF ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE 2003 DEBT ISSUANCE SUSPENSION PERIOD passim (2004), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04526.pdf. 
 159.  Id. 
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In addition, the debt ceiling statute serves as a backstop to the 
budget process.. Krishnakumar argues that the 1974 Budget Act, 
which allocated budgetary authority from a group of appropriations 
subcommittee chairmen to a new central Congressional Budget 
Committee, actually resulted in “increased party control and 
manipulation of the budget process at the expense of diverse floor 
deliberation” as she argues that the fact that a single chairman would 
be more susceptible to party control than several subcommittees.160 
Another restraint imposed on typical Senate procedure is that rulings 
of the presiding officer on points of order relating to budget issues 
require a sixty-vote majority to overturn, rather than the simple 
majority usually required.161 That filibuster right is also constrained 
for specific votes. For example, some of the exceptions to the 
filibuster state that budget resolutions and budget reconciliation 
amendments, motions to proceed to consideration of those 
amendments, and questions of germaneness on appropriations 
amendments are all non-debatable.162 The result is that the filibuster 
does not operate for consideration of the budget and appropriations 
process. This limits the ability of individual senators to challenge 
Senate leadership and enforce the unique deliberative process of the 
Senate. There is also an important procedural difference between 
votes on the budget resolution and votes on increases in the debt 
ceiling: the budget resolution cannot be filibustered, but a vote to 
authorize an increase in the debt ceiling can be filibustered.163 The 
national debt limit vote helps to buttress the procedural protection 
of the Senate, which is limited in the annual budget context, and 
brings that procedural protection to bear in making the less-frequent 
statutory debt ceiling vote an opportunity for long-term 
contemplation of the nation’s financial situation. The ability of 
senators to extend debate indefinitely, or filibuster, and the corollary 
cloture process requiring sixty votes to proceed, are two of the 
defining features of the Senate.164 In effect, highly contentious issues 
 
 160. Krishnakumar, supra note 119, at 152. 
 161. See Pub. L. No. 99-177 § 271(b), 99 Stat. 1037, 1094, amended by Pub. L. No. 
100-119, tit. II, § 211, 101 Stat. 787 (1987). 
 162. See MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 68–69 (2008). 
 163. See id. (listing procedures immune from filibuster). 
 164. See Douglas Dion, William MacMillan & Charles R. Shipan, A War of Words: 
Explaining the Duration of the Filibuster in the U.S. Senate, 1919–1993, at 1 (April 15, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, University of Iowa), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019807. 
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can require a sixty-vote threshold for approval rather than a mere 
majority.  
Even more importantly, the prospect of having to add the debt 
of bailed-out institutions into the national debt would discourage 
the government from bailing out institutions in the first place. This is 
because the government would be faced with two difficult votes: an 
initial appropriation for the bailout (which would likely be rushed 
due to financial panic) and a debt ceiling vote (the timeline for which 
would be brought substantially forward). There is a surplus of 
literature detailing the economic effects of government bailout on 
moral hazard, and the consistent conclusion of this literature is that 
governments are hard-pressed to commit to not bailing out 
institutions; this leads institutions to take risks that ultimately 
pressure governments to later bail them out.165 Including the debt of 
bailed-out institutions in the debt ceiling might, however, offer an 
element of credible commitment that could limit not only actual 
instances of government bailout but also increase the distorting 
effects on market behavior that the potential for government bailout 
encourages, particularly in the financial services sector. 
VI. THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
Another reporting mechanism independent of the budgetary 
process is the preparation of the financial statements of the United 
States. The Government Management Reform Act of 1994 requires 
the preparation and audit of consolidated financial statements for the 
federal government.166 The Federal Financial Management 
Improvement Act of 1996 “directs [agency] auditors to report on 
whether agency financial statements comply . . . with federal 
accounting standards.”167 In 1990, the OMB, Treasury Department, 
and GAO, three agencies claiming lead responsibility for 
promulgating federal financial accounting standards, created the 
Federal Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Board 
(“FASAB”).168 The FASAB issues a number of pronouncements 
 
 165. Cf. Dani Rodrik & Richard Zeckhauser, The Dilemma of Government Responsiveness, 
7 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601 (1988) (detailing general dilemma of government’s 
inability to bind itself not to act, and citing multiple sources). 
 166. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 297 (3d. ed. 
2007). 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 293. 
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which those agencies, and all agencies of the federal government, are 
then expected to follow in implementing particular accounting 
policies for their agencies.169 The financial statements of the United 
States opted to recognize the securities taken in the GSEs, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, at their investment value.170 They have not 
yet been released with respect to the BOEs, but their governing 
pronouncements offer a window into their expected position. 
With respect to accounting for the nation’s debt and asset 
position in the financial statements of the United States, put 
together annually by the Department of the Treasury, the governing 
pronouncement is FASAB Statement of Federal Financial 
Accounting Concepts 2: Entity and Display.171 This Statement helps 
define entities that should be included on the federal government’s 
financial statements.172 The purpose of that inquiry is to ensure that 
the following is true of the reported entities: (1) the federal 
government has some control over deployment of resources and 
some accountability for the entity’s performance; (2) “the entity’s 
scope is such that inclusion would provide a meaningful 
representation of operations and financial condition;” and (3) that 
there are likely to be users of those statements who would find the 
information useful in their own resource allocation decisions and 
would use it to hold the government entity accountable.173 
FASAB statements are intended to guide the OMB in setting the 
government’s rules for financial statement preparation.174 This 
guidance is intended to ultimately help hold the government 
accountable for its taxing and spending decisions by presenting 
accurately the effects of new policies on the budget.175 FASAB 
outlines a number of informative criteria for determining whether to 
consolidate an entity into the federal government’s books, including 
some which hold particular relevance in this context: (1) “whether it 
is owned by the federal government”; (2) whether the government 
 
 169. See, e.g., Statements of Federal Financial Accounting Concepts and Standards, FED. 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD. (2008), available at http://www.fasab.gov/ 
pdffiles/codification_report2008.pdf (representing an example of such pronouncements) 
[hereinafter FASAB]. 
 170. See 2008 U.S. DEP’T TREASURY FIN. REP. U.S. GOV’T 62. 
 171. See FASAB, supra note 169, at 76. 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id.  
 174. See id. at 79. 
 175. See id. at 80. 
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has “the ability to select or remove the governing authority . . . 
particularly if there is to be a significant continued relationship with 
the governing authority or management with respect to carrying out 
important public functions”; (3) whether the government has “the 
ability to veto, overrule, or modify governing body decisions or 
otherwise significantly influence normal operations”; and (4) 
whether and the extent to which the government retains implicit or 
“moral responsibility” for the entity’s debt.176 
FASAB makes clear that the Federal Reserve System is not 
considered part of the “government-wide reporting entity” because 
of the Federal Reserve’s operational independence from the 
executive branch.177 Even if this is the case, it does not speak for 
excluding AIG from consolidation. Though the Federal Reserve 
created the trust that serves as custodian of the Federal Reserve’s 
investment in AIG, the operating documents of that trust make clear 
that the trustees look to the Treasury Department for leadership.178 
The fiduciary duty of the trustees is in fact specifically defined as 
being to the best interest of the Treasury.179 FASAB makes a curious 
decision about accounting for government sponsored enterprises. It 
says, with little analysis, that they do not function in a manner 
consistent with the indicative criteria.180 Even if this is true in the 
general case, that rule was not promulgated at a time in which the 
GSE were, as they are now, under federal conservatorship and 
subject to an explicit and unlimited guarantee from the Treasury 
Department, and given a special accommodation from the Federal 
Reserve to agree to buy vast quantities of GSE debt.  
It also makes a curious observation about bailout entities. It 
notes that  
[t]he Federal Government occasionally bails out, i.e. guarantees or 
pays debt, for a privately owned entity whose failure could have an 
adverse effect on the nation’s economy . . . . As a condition of the 
bailout, the Federal Government frequently obtains rights similar 
 
 176. See id. at 90–91. 
 177. Id. at 93. 
 178. See J.W. Verret, Testimony Before the House Committee Concerning the AIG Trust 
Agreement and Implications for Pending Citigroup and Other TARP Trust 2 (George Mason 
Univ. Law & Econ., Research Paper Series 09-27, 2009), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1408188. 
 179. Id.  
 180. FASAB, supra note 169, at 91–92. 
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to the indicative criteria . . . . The existence of these rights does not 
make the bailed out entity part of the Federal Government 
reporting entity or any of the other reporting entities that are part 
of the Federal Government.181  
This blanket statement is offered with little analysis of why 
ignoring nearly all of the indicative criteria listed in the entity 
reporting guidance is logical or consistent with the objectives of 
federal financial reporting.182 But even assuming it were consistent, 
the federal government’s actual behavior in directing corporate 
policy at many bailed-out entities can still provide the extra support 
to remain consistent with FASAB and still support consolidation of 
the TARP recipients. 
With respect to the financial statements of the United States, 
consolidation would reshape important items in the financial 
statements, including the balance sheet estimates of assets and debt, 
the statement of net costs, the statement of operations, the 
reconciliation of net operating revenue or cost with the unified 
budget surplus or deficit, the comparison of actual budget uses with  
projected budget uses, and the statement of changes in cash 
balance.183 
The existing pronouncements from public sector accounting 
principles are a useful beginning, but it is also worthwhile to examine 
the private sector’s approach to consolidation as well. Private sector 
accounting and public sector accounting are distinctive. Private 
sector accounting preceded and informed the development of public 
sector methods. Though they have many close analogues, they are 
promulgated by different bodies. One of the significant distinctions 
of governments is that they have the power to print money and to 
 
 181. Id. at 92. 
 182. Id. By contrast, The United Kingdom 1989 Companies Act offers a clear rule on 
consolidation of financial reporting for its private sector analogue to GAAP. Newby, supra 
note 108, at 155. The indicative criteria it lists for consolidation of a subsidiary investment, 
based on Article I of the EC Seventh Directive, include any of the following: “a majority of 
voting rights, control of the membership of the administrative, management, or supervisory 
body, [or] the right to exercise dominant influence” defined as “influence exercised to achieve 
the operating and financial policies desired by the holder of that influence.” Id. The U.K. 
definition does not exclude powers that an owner might hold by, for instance, its concomitant 
status as a major creditor or regulator of the entity. Id. 
 183. See FASAB, supra note 169, at 110; see also Overview of Federal Accounting Concepts 
and Standards, FED. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BD., 12–13 (September 30, 1996), 
http://www.fasab.gov/pdffiles/con_stan.pdf. 
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tax citizens to pay off their debts.184 Yet, with the bailout the 
principles behind private and public sector accounting 
methodologies are merging in a unique way. The government holds 
control over private sector entities, many of which still have publicly 
traded equity. Their private sector objectives remain, but have been 
meshed with public sector goals as well. As such, this unique 
dynamic consideration of using private sector accounting methods 
for the federal government’s foray into the private sector may be 
consistent with the objectives of federal financial statements and 
budget laws. 
The private sector takes, in certain circumstances, a whole entity 
approach to accounting for a parent entity that has partial but 
controlling ownership in another entity. The reasoning behind the 
entity approach is to treat entities that are jointly controlled as 
one.185 Though some may argue that consolidation of subsidiary 
activities onto the books of a controlling investor is a useless exercise, 
since investors can perform the consolidations themselves if they 
think it presents a more accurate picture of the parent firm. 
However, evidence indicates that the issuance of SFAS 94, the 
current rule requiring consolidation of majority owned subsidiaries, 
resulted in a substantial decrease in market share value for those 
firms affected by the accounting rule change.186 This indicates that 
consolidation of partly owned but controlled entities altered the 
market’s perception of the value of the controlling firm. 
Under an initial accounting rule, companies were required to 
consolidate firms over which they held a greater than 50% voting 
interest.187 In 1971, APB No. 18 was issued, which required 
 
 184. See Michael J. Boskin, Concepts and Measures of Federal Deficits and Debt and Their 
Impact on Economic Activity 25 (NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2332, 
1987), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=303492. 
 185. Maurice Moonitz, The Entity Approach to Consolidated Statements, 17 ACCT. REV. 
236, 237 (1942) (stating that “[t]he central premise is that consolidated statements are 
exhibits in conventional accounting form of the status and operations of a group of related 
companies—exhibits prepared as though the companies were legally as well as economically 
mere administrative subdivisions of one concern. The legal separateness of each unit is 
disregarded, the fiction of separate corporate entities ignored. Legal lines of cleavage are 
replaced by the more useful but less definite boundaries of economic unity. That consolidated 
statements are of primary interest to investors and creditors of the dominant company is a 
corollary of our major premise.”).  
 186. Inder Khurana, Security Market Effects Associated with SFAS No. 94 Concerning 
Consolidation Policy, 66 ACCT. REV. 611, 613 (1991). 
 187. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has been trying to reconcile the 
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companies to use the equity method in accounting for companies 
over which they held significant influence, defined as ownership of 
between 20% and 50% of voting stock.188 “Under the equity method, 
an investor company would recognize its proportionate share of the 
investee’s GAAP income along with an offsetting increase in the 
investment asset, and recognize dividends as a decrease in the 
investment asset.”189  
The general difference between the equity method and full 
consolidation is that a company fully consolidating will appear larger, 
with more assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses, whereas a 
company using the equity method to recognize its investment in a 
subsidiary will have better debt-to-equity ratios and ratios for return 
on assets and sales.190 This results in many companies taking a 49% 
interest in subsidiaries to avoid full consolidation, dubbed the “49% 
solution.”191 In 1987 FASB issued SFAS 94, which modified APB 51 
and made clear that a previous exception permitting non-
consolidation if the subsidiary was in a different line of business from 
the parent was no longer valid.192 SFAS 94 also stated FASB’s goal of 
developing a reporting entity concept which should be based on a 




evolving standards for consolidation into a single codification through its consolidation 
project. Private Sector accounting principles (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles or 
GAAP) on consolidation begins with Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51, Consolidated 
Financial Statements (ARB 51), promulgated in 1959. Al L. Hartgraves & George J. Bentson, 
The Evolving Accounting Standards for Special Purpose Entitites and Consolidations, 16 ACCT. 
HORIZONS 245, 248 (2002). That initial guidance was subsequently reshaped by Statement on 
Financial Accounting Standard 94 (SFAS 94), Consolidation of All Majority-Owned 
Subsidiaries in 1987. Also related subsequent rules include SFAS 144, Accounting for the 
Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets in 2001 and FASB Interpretation No. 46 
(Revised December 2003), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities: An Interpretation of 
ARB No. 51 (FIN 46(R)). Under ARB 51, consolidated financial statements were necessary if 
one of the companies in the group had a direct or indirect controlling financial interest in the 
other companies (control being defined as having ownership of a majority voting interest, with 
particular emphasis placed on the ownership of more than 50% of the outstanding voting 
equity of the company). Id. at 255.  
 188. Id. at 249. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 250. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Dennis R. Beresford, Should the FASB Abandon the Consolidation Project?, J. OF 
CORP. ACCT. & FIN., 51, available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext/113441390/PDFSTART. 
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ownership, indicating that sub-majority control would be sufficient 
to require consolidation.193  
The equity method displayed the investor’s share of the 
investee’s net assets and net income as single and separate items on 
the parent’s income statement and balance sheet.194 A firm reports its 
investment in an entity as a single line item, like “investment in 
subsidiary,” at the cost to initially purchase the investment.195 In 
each accounting period the investor’s proportionate share of the 
investee’s net income or loss is included as a single line item. Any 
 
 193. Hartgraves & Bentson, supra note 187, at 250. In 1999 FASB issued a proposed 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS), Consolidated Financial Statements: 
Purpose and Policy: Revision of Exposure Draft issued October 16, 1995. This statement was 
part of the FASB’s ongoing consolidation project to reshape its consolidation rules to cover a 
broader effective control definition to include sub-majority control effectuated through a lack 
of other large shareholders or through contractual provisions giving control to the sub-
majority shareholder. Id. at 255. This Statement requires a reporting entity to consolidate the 
financial statements of all entities that it controls, where control is now defined in a much 
broader way to encompass methods other than holding a majority of voting shares. The FASB 
determined in 1999 that it lacked the board votes to approve a final draft, and so the project is 
still ongoing. Paragraph 6 of the exposure draft defines control as relating to two key 
characteristics: 
a) a parent’s decision-making ability (that is not shared with others) that enables it 
to guide the ongoing activities of its subsidiary; and b) a parent’s ability to use that 
power to increase the benefits that it derives and limit the losses that it suffers from 
the activities of that subsidiary. These characteristics, which are similar to those 
included in the control concept adopted by international accounting standards and 
already adopted by the European Union and many other foreign countries, 
can be based on holding a controlling block of voting equity shares, but they may also result 
from other sources of control. Patrick A. Casabona & Alex Ashwal, The Concept of Control in 
Consolidated Financial Statements: Convergence of U.S. and International Accounting Rules, 
26 REV. OF BUS. 36 (2005). The proposed Statement also provides guidance for applying its 
definition of control, which includes the following situations identified in paragraphs 18 and 
21 that lead to rebuttable presumptions of control: 
i) The entity has a majority voting interest in the election of a corporation’s 
governing body or a right to appoint a majority of its members. ii) The entity has a 
large minority voting interest in the election of a corporation’s governing body and 
no other party has a significant voting interest. iii) The entity has a unilateral ability 
to 1) obtain a majority voting interest in the election of a corporation’s governing 
body or 2) obtain a right to appoint a majority of the corporation’s governing body 
through the present ownership of convertible securities or other rights that are 
currently exercisable at the option of the holder and the expected benefit from 
converting those securities or exercising that right exceeds its expected cost. 
See Federal Accounting Standards Board, Consolidated Financial Statements: Purpose and 
Policy, 19–22 (1995). 
 194. Mark P. Bauman, The Impact and Valuation of Off-Balance-Sheet Activities 
Concealed by Equity Method Accounting, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 303 (2003). 
 195. Id. at 305. 
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difference between the initial cost of the investment and the 
investor’s subsequent percentage interest of net assets is allocated to 
identifiable assets of the investee. The investment account is adjusted 
downward if the investee gives the investor dividend payments. 
Critics of the equity method assert that it distorts the financial 
statements of the investor by, for example, overstating the investor’s 
return on assets and other leverage ratios.196 
An alternative method is proportionate consolidation, which 
consolidates the parent entity’s proportionate share of each 
component of net assets and net income into the parent’s books. For 
instance, a 40% investor would add 40% of the controlled 
subsidiary’s short term debt, accounts receivable, cash, property, 
accounts payable, electricity expense, and all other financial 
statement components (except for stockholder’s equity and retained 
earnings) into each individual line item on the books of the parent 
entity.197 Critics of proportionate consolidation assert that it is 
inappropriate in the absence of an explicit guarantee from the parent 
for the investee’s debts.198 
These different methods produce widely different results. Studies 
comparing the two methods find that proportionate consolidation is 
a better predictor of investor profits than equity method 
accounting.199 It is unclear which method would be more 
appropriate for government consolidation of BOEs, and it may differ 
depending on the entity, but either of them would provide more 
information than the current at-cost method. Bauman also 
demonstrates empirically that market participants tend to place more 
weight on off-balance sheet liabilities than off-balance sheet assets, 
thus supporting the idea that consolidation of debt rather than of 
assets is the central reason users of financial statements may favor the 
proportionate consolidation method.200 Other accounting research 
demonstrates that bond risk premiums tend to lack the information 
to incorporate implicit guarantees of subsidiary debt.201 Statements 
 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at 303. 
 198. Id. at 305. 
 199. See Roger C. Graham, Jr., & Craig E. Lefanowicz, Evidence of the Relation Between 
Accounting for Equity Investments and Equity Valuation, 11 J. ACCT., AUDITING, & FIN. 587 
(1996). 
 200. See generally Bauman, supra note 194. 
 201. See Ronald L. Stolzfus & Ruth W. Epps, An Empirical Study of the Value-Relevance 
of Using Proportionate Consolidation Accounting for Investments in Joint Ventures, 29 ACCT. 
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from the Treasury Department during the bank stress tests of 2009 
indicate the Treasury’s willingness to guarantee the debt of TARP 
recipients if they are unable to meet capital demanded by the 
Treasury from market offerings, and as such, this finding would 
support the utility of consolidation for both taxpayers and 
bondholders as users of government financial statements and 
accounting projections.202 But even if bondholders can put together 
the necessary information on their own, at the very least it could be 
useful to consider retooling government provided information to 
accurately reflect the government’s liabilities to reduce bondholder 
information costs. Further, literature on voter ignorance shows that 
voters rationally do not take the time to educate themselves about 
policy decisions. But the growth in the national debt or deficit is a 
fairly simple concept by comparison. 
Newby asserts one argument against consolidation of 
government owned enterprises: accounting consolidation, and the 
accompanying statutory authorizations to require government 
owned companies to give information to the government in order to 
facilitate the government’s obtaining information to fulfill its 
accounting statement requirements actually gives the government 
more control over the government owned company. Newby argues 
that accounting policy actually creates the reality rather than the 
other way around.203 It seems clear however that whatever minor 
influence the government might gain would be dwarfed by the 
influence it possesses, as discussed in the analysis in Section II of this 
Article. Further, the independence of GAAP promulgated by the 
private sector could easily be maintained.204 
 
FORUM 169 (2005). 
 202. There is some evidence to indicate that private markets already assume that the 
government stands fully behind the debt of TARP companies, as the price of bonds for 
companies like Citigroup have maintained most of the value through the financial crisis. See, 
e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 2. 
 203. Newby, supra note 108, at 213. 
 204. One issue that might be raised with respect to government consolidation of private 
sector financial statements would be the timing disparity between the financial years for private 
entities versus the budget cycle and financial statement year for the federal government, which 
would involve reporting years that ended on different dates. As such, if for example the private 
sector entity had to give information to the government prior to its issuance of an annual 
report, including that information in a report issued by the government might leak information 
to the public and to competitors in advance of the timing required under the existing SEC 
reporting requirements. Or, if a convention were adopted that government financial estimates 
consolidated items from the most recently issued financial statements of the private entities, it 
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A. Economists as Users of Financial Statements 
There are a number of users of government financial statements, 
including purchasers of government bonds, who seek to price the 
riskiness and returns of their investments. Examples of such members 
include: members of Congress who are exercising their constitutional 
oversight duties, taxpayers seeking to hold elected officials 
accountable, and economists who make predictions about the future 
of the economy.205 
Economists as early as Adam Smith argued that government 
labor was less productive than private labor.206 One articulation is 
that if the government were to borrow money from banks to finance 
its investment spending, the government’s increased purchasing 
power would drive up the price of the goods it purchased, deterring 
private investment.207 In the present context, the government would 
not need to borrow from banks, but could actually direct fiscal policy 
actions through its control over the corporate policies of the banks 
themselves.  
Keynes himself even notes that “[w]ith the confused psychology 
which often prevails, the Government programme may, through its 
effect on ‘confidence,’ increase liquidity-preference or diminish the 
marginal efficiency of capital, which, again, may retard other 
investment unless measures are taken to offset it.”208 What Keynes 
did not consider, and what may even enhance this effect, is that the 
business psychology of the financial services industry could change 
substantially when the government becomes a controlling owner of a 
bank or of a bank’s competitor. 
One policy argument which favors making sure that the 
government’s deficit and debt are both properly estimated, and 
demonstrate the government’s influence over the productive assets 
 
could be the case that the government reports would be inaccurate by a large margin. 
Consolidation would also require that the government adopt policies with respect to the 
consolidation of transactions that are estimated using different conventions in the private 
sector than in the public sector. 
 205. Newby, supra note 108, at 190. 
 206. See Roger W. Spencer & William P. Yohe, The “Crowding Out” of Private 
Expenditures by Fiscal Policy Actions, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 12, 15 (Oct. 
1970). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Spencer & Yohe, supra note 206, at 17 (citing JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE 
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 120 (Harcourt Brace and 
Company, 1936)). 
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of the national economy, is that it will present a more accurate input 
to determine the crowding out effect of government spending. The 
crowding out effect holds that public debt crowds out private saving 
and ultimately diminishes capital formation.209 The budget deficit or 
surplus is an estimate of the difference between federal expenditures 
and federal receipts for a certain year, and it reflects the amount the 
government will need to borrow to finance that deficit.210 Amounts 
the government must borrow are not available for private 
investment, resulting in consequences for future interest rates, 
inflation, and the long run performance of the economy.211 Barro 
offers an alternative view, the notion of Ricardian equivalence, 
whereby increases in public debt result in an increased demand for 
public debt, effectively arguing that the private sector can undo the 
government’s redistribution of resources across generations.212 
The Ricardian equivalence conjecture rests on a number of 
unlikely assumptions, including that taxation is non-distortionary 
and that the private and public sectors use the same discount rate.213 
Thus crowding out would seem to be an important effect of 
government spending, with its precise magnitude remaining an open 
question. The inflationary effects of government spending have also 
been argued.214 Many studies of government deficits focus on 
nominally reported amounts, although a few economists have argued 
for adjustments. Feldstein argues in favor of adjusting for the  
unfunded liabilities of Social Security.215 Boskin argues for including 
the effect of government lending and guarantees.216  
The effect of government spending on private investment is hotly 
debated.217 One group of economists demonstrate that if all 
 
 209. Boskin, supra note 184, at 13. 
 210. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 120, at 4. 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Boskin, supra note 184, at 14; see also James R. Barth, George Iden, & Frank S. 
Russek, Do Federal Deficits Really Matter?, 3 CONTEMP POL’Y ISSUES 79 (Fall 1984). 
 213. Boskin, supra note 184. 
 214. See id. at 6. 
 215. Martin S. Feldstein, Social Security, Induced Retirement and Aggregate Capital 
Accumulation, 82 J. POL. & ECON. 905 (1974). 
 216. Michael D. Hurd & Michael J. Boskin, The Effect of Social Security on Retirement in 
the Early 1970s, 99 Q. J. ECON. 767 (1984). 
 217. Costas Azariadis & Pietro Reichlin, Increasing Returns and Crowding Out, 20 J. 
ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 847 (1995); Peter A. Diamond, National Debt in a 
Neoclassical Growth Model, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 1126 (1965); Franco Modigliani, Long-Run 
Implications of Alternative Fiscal Policies and the Burden of National Debt, 71 ECON. J. 730 
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government debt were eliminated in OECD countries, real interest 
rates would fall by 163 basis points, and potentially more depending 
on assumptions about the number of consumers that are liquidity 
constrained.218 They include an assumption of a positive birth rate 
which tends to reduce any element of Ricardian equivalence in 
crowding-out models.219 They also conclude that the roughly 20% 
increase in debt/GDP ratio of large OECD countries over the 
period from 1975–1996 resulted in a loss of roughly 2.9% in annual 
GDP growth. The growth in the government’s debt/GDP ratio over 
the last five years would seem to indicate much greater fallout. A 
proper accounting for the Treasury Department’s investment in 
TARP recipients, however, would dramatically increase a proper 
estimate of that cost to GDP growth. The debt and deficit are not 
merely the focus of academic studies, professional economic 
forecasters at banks, and trade groups. The Federal Open Market 
Committee of the Federal Reserve Board also uses these inputs to 
guide investment and policy decisions for thousands of member 
banks, clients, and investment professionals. 
Some economists argue that fiscal policy actions or increased 
government spending financed by government borrowing and 
designed to stimulate economic growth fail to accomplish their 
objective. This failure can be explained by the fact that additional 
government borrowing crowds out of the market an equal, or even 
greater, volume of borrowing that would have financed private 
investment.220 Crowding out is offered as an argument against the so 
called Keynesian multiplier, which is an assumption that government 
spending leads to positive changes in aggregate demand through 




(1961); Gilles Saint-Paul, Fiscal Policy in an Endogenous Growth Model, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1243 
(1992); J.E. Meade, Is the National Debt a Burden?, 10 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 163 (1958).  
 218. Hamid Faruqee, Douglas Laxton, & Steve Symansky, Government Debt, Life-Cycle 
Income and Liquidity Constraints: Beyond Approximate Ricardian Equivalence (Int’l Monetary 
Fund Working Paper, 1996) (assuming that 20% of consumers are young and thus more likely 
to be liquidity constrained. The pending crisis in entitlements indicates that older baby 
boomers may also face similar liquidity constraints, thus indicating that their estimate may 
reflect the low end of the spectrum.). 
 219. Id. at 22. 
 220. See Spencer & Yohe, supra note 206, at 13. 
 221. Id. at 13. 
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crowding out does in fact occur, it is less likely when the economy is 
operating at substantially less than full employment.222 
Regardless of the outcome of the crowding-out debate, the 
public/private distinction has become a clear point of delineation for 
that debate and for the inputs around which the models in that 
debate are crafted. As such, a convention to account for the 
government’s investment in private enterprise requires careful 
consideration and more depth than the government’s self-serving 
interest in keeping liabilities and subsidies off-budget and 
unconstrained from Congressional review. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Much of the existing literature on bailouts focuses on the moral 
hazard problems created by the prospect of bailout. The debates in 
that arena concern whether governments should bail out companies 
and how the financial regulators should determine whether bailout is 
appropriate. A few other writers in this area have recently worked on 
the issue of bailout design, trying to determine a method to backstop 
the private markets in a way that harnesses private market solutions 
through auctions and other procedures. But surprisingly little 
attention has been paid to the laws governing the national debt and 
financial statements. There has also been surprisingly little focus on 
how to get governments to internalize the effects of their actions in 
exercising control over companies. This Article offers an initial look 
into both unexplored areas. 
Financial accounting is intended to guide users of financial 
statements in their interactions with the entity under review by 
giving them an accurate picture of historical operations. The existing 
legal and accounting approach to recognizing bailed-out entities 
evade these important functions. By its control over private sector 
companies, the executive branch has the ability to facilitate transfers 
and subsidies off-budget through its control over bailout recipients. 
As such, a failure to consolidate the operations of bailout recipients 
hides a significant level of economic activity over which the 
government has control and financial responsibility. The private 
sector has developed accounting procedures to deal with this 
problem in its consolidation rules. The public sector accounting rules 
also have a consolidation provision, but the regulators have opted to 
 
 222. Id. at 24. 
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carve out an exception with little justification for bailed-out entities. 
However, a consolidation mechanism for government control over 
bailed-out entities is essential to maintain the transparency objective 
of government financial statements. 
The national debt ceiling functions as a powerful limit on 
congressional spending. It fulfills a vital Constitutional function of 
providing the legislature with a means to fulfill its ability to check the 
executive branch’s discretion in spending. But the legislature has 
unwittingly ceded much of its spending and debt oversight powers 
and responsibilities through the bailout. Not only does the bailout 
operate as a revolving appropriation, but it gives the government 
authority to sidestep formal appropriations in favor of off balance 
sheet transfers. In order to realign the executive branch’s incentives 
to minimize their likelihood of abusing this discretion, the debt of 
bailed-out entities should also be included in the debt ceiling 
calculation. That way, the legislature’s participation in the process is 
restored and both branches have a realigned set of incentives with 
respect to bailed-out entities. They will face budgetary pressure to 
privatize bailed-out entities held, and also reconsider the need to 
bailout firms in the first place. 
To the extent that there has been some limited debate about 
consolidation of off-balance sheet entities, this debate has typically 
focused on the Social Security Trust or the government sponsored 
entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The former is a distinct issue, 
and the latter is only the beginning of the problem. Before the 
financial crisis began, government regulators frequently commented 
that they would not bail out risky financial institutions, in the hopes 
that market distortions based on that assumption could be limited. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s regulator also made clear that the 
GSEs were private sector companies that weren’t the beneficiaries of 
unlimited government backing. Fannie and Freddie’s executives 
asserted that their private sector goals of profit maximization were 
consistent with their goals of subsidizing the mortgage market. All 
three of those pronouncements lack as much credibility now as they 
did when they were made. The best way to limit the distorting 
effects of government control over private firms is to recognize the 
costs of government control within the mechanisms that control and 
report on the government’s finances by consolidation of bailed-out 
entities. 
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